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Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of
Human Rights Fact-Finding
Diane F. Orentlicher*

As the prestige and influence of human rights organizations have grown
worldwide, the fact-finding methods employed by these organizationswarrant
increased scrutiny. In this Article, Diane Orentlicher offers a comprehensive
analysis of the professional standards and institutionalimperatives of international nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"). Part I discusses the importance of human rights fact-finding, with a focus on the Reagan Administrations' policies. Part II addresses the manner in which an NGO must
confront official skepticism and shifting standards of credibility. Part III
describes the means employed in obtaining evidence, interviewing witnesses, and
establishingresponsibilityfor human rights violations.
The field of international human rights has come of age. No longer
the exclusive province of theorists and idealists, human rights has
become a prominent subject of international diplomacy. In regions as
diverse as Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa, human
rights concerns have been a central factor in some of the most dramatic
political developments of the past decade.
Throughout this process, the prestige of nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") that work to promote respect for human rights has
also grown. Representatives of such leading NGOs as Amnesty International ("AI") routinely meet with heads of state and other top officials
of the governments they monitor, Iand their work receives prominent
play in the international press.
* Visiting Lecturer and Orville Schell Fellow, Yale Law School; Deputy Director, awyers
Committee for Human Rights (1983-1988). The author is grateful for the cooperation of
numerous colleagues who generously shared their insights about the subject of this Article,
particularly the research staff of Amnesty International and the professional staff of Human
Rights Watch, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights. The author is especially indebted to Andrew Moravcsik and Jemera Rone, whose
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article were invaluable. Responsibility for the
views, and any errors, in the final draft is the author's alone.
1. Even governments that refuse to meet with NGO representatives take some human rights
organizations seriously enough to publicly denounce their work. For example, the government
of the People's Republic of Kampuchea ("PRK"), which had failed to respond to repeated
requests by the New York-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights to visit the PRK and
meet with government officials, later denounced the Committee's report as "an insane slander."
U.S. Lawy ers' Report on Human Rights Criticized, Phnom Penh Domestic Service, Aug. 7, 1985,
reported in Foreign Broadcast Info. Service, Aug. 9, 1985, at HI.
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A variety of factors account for the growing influence of the leading
human rights NGOs, but their achievements rest, above all, on the
quality of their work. And while NGOs undertake a range of activities
to promote their concerns, perhaps none has been more influential
than their efforts to document and publicize human rights violations.
The premise of these efforts is straightforward: human rights professionals believe that no action is more effective in prompting governments to curb human rights violations than aiming the spotlight of
2
public scrutiny on the depredations themselves.
The strategy-promoting change by reporting facts-is almost elegant in its simplicity. And there is growing evidence that it works.
Governments frequently have adopted reforms in response to critical
reports by NGOs, 3 and former political prisoners who had been subjects of AI letter writing campaigns have often attributed their release
from detention to A1. 4 Country reports prepared by the more prominent NGOs often receive front page news coverage abroad, 5 and in
the United States, such reports have prompted Congress to adopt
legislation suspending foreign aid or conditioning future aid on a
6
country's compliance with international human rights standards.

2. See Satchell, The Greatest Evil is Indifference, PARADE, May 12, 1985, at 6. ("By publicizing
abuses, Amnesty [International] hopes that the leaders of repressive regimes will be shamed or
pressured into curbing torture in the glare of world public opinion and, perhaps, the censure of
other nations.") Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, believes that publicizing human rights violations is "not only the most powerful weapon [against abuses]; it is
the only weapon." Address by Aryeh Neier, Harvard University (Oct. 9, 1985) [hereinafter
Neier Address].
That many governments continue to commit or tolerate serious abuses despite international
criticism does not necessarily detract from the view expressed by Neier and other human rights
advocates. The desire to avoid public condemnation may be outweighed by counterveiling
domestic concerns. Also, governments sometimes calculate that criticism of their human rights
records will dissipate over time.
In contrast to most human rights organizations, the Geneva-based International Committee
of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), a humanitarian organization, obs rves a general, but not unqualified,
policy of reporting its concerns to government officials on a confidential basis.
3. When, for example, the Lagos-based Civil Liberties Organization publicized abuses of
detainees held in a prison colony that had been established secretly one decade earlier, the
Nigerian government "reacted almost immediately to the reports by removing all the prisoners
and shutting down the colony." N.Y. Times, June 29, 1989, at A4, col. 4. See also LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, SEEKING SHELTER: CAMBODIANS IN THAILAND (1987) (report

revised to reflect changes made by Thai officials in response to a draft report).
4. See Satchell, supra note 2, at 6.
5. See, e.g., Stability in R.I. Higher Priority Than Human Rights: Report, Indonesia Observer

(AP), Nov. 22, 1988, at 1 (account of report on human rights in Indonesia prepared by New
York-based Asia Watch).
6. For example, a publication listing torture victims and torturers prepared by Al in 1976
played an important role in prompting Congress to suspend aid to Uruguay for fiscal year 1977.
See L. SCHOuL'z, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 41

(1981). The staffs of human rights NGOs also have played a major role in drafting and securing
passage of key human rights laws adopted by Congress over the years. See id. at 105-7.
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As the influence of NGO human rights reporting has grown, NGOs'
underlying research methodology has come under heightened scrutiny
and, at times, pointed attack. In an age when acquiring the status of
"human rights pariah" carries unprecedented costs internationally,
governments whose rights violations are publicized frequently respond
by challenging the credibility of the fact-finding methodology. 7 United
States officials, too, have publicly attacked the credibility of organizations that released reports chronicling abuses committed by strategic
allies of the United States government.'
In this setting, perhaps no asset is more important to a human
rights NGO than the credibility of its fact-finding and, in particular,
its reputation for meticulous methodology. 9 Despite the unprecedented
attention to issues of human rights methodology, however, the leading
NGOs have not adopted uniform methodological standards; most have
not even adopted comprehensive, formal standards for use by their
own staffs. And while NGO reporting has drawn the close scrutiny
of various parties, critiques of NGO methodology do not reflect a
coherent set of commonly accepted standards.
This Article examines the reasons underlying these seeming anomalies. Part I reviews the historical developments that have lent
prominence to fact-finding methodology. Part II analyzes emerging
standards used to judge the credibility of the reporting activities1° of
international NGOs. 11 Part III examines methodological techniques
7. For example, when Al released a report in August 1985 on abuses in Zimbabwe, President
Robert Mugabe denied the chief allegations, and underscored his challenge to Al's credibility
by referring to the organization as "Amnesty Lies International." See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, ZIMBABWE: WAGES OF WAR: A REPORT ON HuMAN RIGHTS 9 (1986). Such

denials increasingly have eclipsed in importance the standard charge that foreign criticism of a
government's human rights record constitutes "interference in domestic affairs." Although the
latter response is still heard, many governments who assert it nonetheless feel obliged to respond
to the substantive allegations.
8. See Part 1B, infra
at text accompanying notes 34-39 (discussing Administration efforts to
discredit NGO reports).
9. The most influential human rights NGOs have earned wide respect because of their staffs'
highly sophisticated fact-finding skills. See generally Uhlig, As Colombian Terror Grows, the Press
Becomes the Prey, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1989, at Al, col. 6 (noting that the New York-based
Committee to Protect Journalists "records only the most rigorously documented cases"); Satchell,
supra note 2, at 6 (Amnesty International "enjoys a reputation for scrupulous research and strict
impartiality as itcatalogues abuses .... ).

10. This Article focuses on the preparation of substantial reports on human rights conditions
in particular countries. It should be noted, however, that fact-finding activities underlie other
NGO efforts, such as casework on behalf of individuals. The latter raise somewhat different
methodological issues than the former.
11. "International NGOs," in this Article, refers to organizations concerned with human
rights conditions in various countries. These organizations contrast with "domestic NGOs,"
which are concerned solely with the human rights conditions in the country in which the
organization operates. Some international NGOs, such as the Washington Office on Latin
America and Americas Watch, have a regional focus. Others, including the International League
for Human Rights, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and the International Human
Rights Law Group, monitor a limited group of countries in various regions.
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used by experienced NGOs in the preparation of country reports. The
goals of this Article are modest: to identify some general guideposts
(and potential hazards) for human rights fact-finding methodology and
to set forth the collective wisdom of the NGOs that have developed
recognized competence in human rights fact-finding.
I. THE PROMINENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING
Although debate over issues of human rights fact-finding is international in scope, developments in United States foreign policy during
the Carter and Reagan Administrations played an especially important
role in elevating the prominence of human rights fact-finding activities
and in focusing public attention on issues of methodology. The prominence of these issues was to some extent a natural consequence of the
increased status of human rights concerns in international diplomacy
in the past decade. As argued below, moreover, the particular manner
in which the public debate over the Reagan Administration's human
rights policy unfolded lent further prominence to human rights factfinding issues and played a significant role in shaping the public debate
over methodology. 12
A. The CongressionalInitiative
During the 1970s and early 1980s, human rights received unprecedented attention in public debates about United States foreign policy.
The first substantial efforts to elevate the prominence of human rights
concerns in United States foreign policy were made by Congress, acting
13
with the support of a then small but effective community of NGOs.
In 1973 and 1974, Congress launched a sweeping study of the relationship between human rights and United States foreign policy,
holding more than a dozen public hearings. 14 In the mid to late 197 Os
Congress enacted a series of laws animated by a common purpose: to
12. See infra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
13. See generally SCHOULTZ, supra note 6, at 74-88.

14. In 1973, under the leadership of Rep. Donald Fraser (D-Minn.), the Subcommittee on
International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee began a
series of hearings on United States human rights policy. See International Protection of Human
Rights, The Work of InternationalOrganizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on International Organizationsand Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affiirs,

93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1974). In early 1974, the Fraser Committee issued a 54-page report,
which concluded that a higher priority for human rights in United States foreign policy "is both
morally imperative and practically necessary ....
" SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE HousE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93RD CONG., 2D
SESS., HumAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP (Comm.

Print 1974).
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elevate the status of human rights in United States foreign policy. 15
Congress found general support for its concerns in the Carter Administration, the first to give human rights a prominent place in its
foreign policy. 16 But the lasting impact of the human rights initiatives
launched by Congress-and the Carter Administration--did not become apparent until after President Ronald Reagan assumed office.

B. The Reagan Administration
At the outset of its first term, the Reagan Administration rejected
the view, endorsed by its predecessor, that human rights had a proper
place in United States foreign policy. Believing that the Carter Administration's human rights initiatives had been harmful to United

15. Perhaps the most comprehensive congressional initiatives revolved around a series of laws
that conditioned the availability of various forms of United States aid and trade benefits on a
country's observance of fundamental human rights. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
§ 502B(a)(2), as amended (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)) Pub. L. No. 87-195, pt. 2,
§ 502B, as added Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 46, 88 Star. 1815 (1974), as amended Pub. L. No.
94-329, tit. 3, § 301(a), 90 Stat. 748 (1976); Pub. L. No. 95-105, tit. 1, § 109(a)(3), 91
Stat. 846; Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 6(a)-(d)(1), (e), 10(b)(1), 12(b), 92 Star. 731, 732, 735,
737 (1978), as amended Pub. L. No. 96-53, tit. 5, § 511, 93 Star. 380 (1979); Pub. L. No.
96-92 § 4, 93 Stat. 702 (1979); Pub. L. No. 96-533, tit. 7, § 701(b), 704, 94 Star. 3156,
3157 (1980); Pub. L. No. 98-151, § 101(b)(2), 97 Star. 972 (1983); Pub. L. No. 99-64, tit.
1, § 124, 99 Stat. 156 (1985); Pub. L. No. 99-83, tit. 12, § 1201, 99 Star. 276 (1985)
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982 & Supp. 1986)) (proscribing security assistance
to "any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights"); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 116(e), 22 U.S.C.
§ 2151 note (1982 & Supp. 1986) (original version at Pub. L. No. 87-105, pt. 1, § 116, as
added Pub. L. No. 94-161, tit. 1, § 301, 89 Star. 855 (1975)) (prohibiting development
assistance on similar grounds); International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-118, tit. 7, § 701, 91 Scar. 1069 (1977) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262g (1982 & Supp.
1986)) (directing United States representatives to several multilateral development banks to
oppose loans on human rights grounds).
Some laws were country specific, conditioning aid to certain governments on their compliance
with specific human rights conditions. See, e.g., International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 728, 95 Star. 1519, 1555 (1981) (codified at
22 U.S.C. § 2370 note (1982 & Supp. 1986)) (requiring President to certify every six months,
as condition of continued aid to El Salvador, that specified human rights conditions had been
satisfied); id. § 726 (prohibiting security assistance to Chile unless the President certifies that
Chile has made "significant progress in respecting internationally recognized human rights").
Other congressional initiatives included the enactment of laws designed to ensure that human
rights conditions were considered by the executive branch in its foreign policy decision making
and legislation that barred foreign aid and training to law enforcement agencies of foreign
countries. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, supra § 660.
16. Although the Carter Administration was committed to a general policy of promoting
human rights abroad, it frequently concluded that human rights concerns with respect to
particular countries should be subordinated to national security considerations. See J. MURAvCHIK, THE UNCERTAIN CRUSADE: JIMMY CARTER AND THE DILEMMAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
POLICY 136-37, 139-49 (1986).
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States security interests, 17 the Reagan team came into office determined
to dismantle the Carter policy.18
The Reagan Administration signaled its intentions in several ways.
In Alexander Haig's first public statement as Secretary of State for the
Administration, he announced that "international terrorism" would
replace human rights as the overriding United States foreign policy
concern. 19 To underscore the repudiation of its predecessor's human
rights policy, the Administration nominated to the post of Asssistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Ernest
Lefever, who publicly had opposed the view that human rights were
a proper concern of United States foreign policy.20
The congressional response to Lefever's nomination was a sharp
rebuke to the effort to reverse Carter's policy. The Senate Foreign
21
Relations Committee rejected Lefever's appointment by a 13-4 vote.
The Administration had lost more than a battle for a nominee's
appointment. The Lefever vote firmly established the principle that
human rights concerns had a proper place in United States foreign
policy. The Administration was forced to change course. An internal
State Department memorandum dated October 27, 1981, several
months after the Senate vote, began with the assertion, "Human rights
is at the core of ourforeign policy . . . . 'Human rights' is not something
"...'22
we tack on to our foreign policy, but is its very purpose .
But public controversy over United States human rights policy did
not subside; the issues simply changed. Human rights advocates in
17. For an influential expression of this view, published during the presidential campaign

preceding Reagan's first term, see Kirkpatrick, Dictatorshipsand Double Standards, COMMENTARY,
Nov. 1979, at 34.
18. But see Schifter, United States Human Rights Policy and the Reagan Administration, 2 HARV.
HUM. RTs. Y.B. 3 (1989).
19. Haig News ConferenceJanuary 28, 1981, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT DoC-

(doc. 1298).
20. Even before Reagan's inauguration, a group of advisors on Latin America known as the
"Committee of Santa Fe" stated in its policy blueprint that President Carter's human rights
policy "must be abandoned." Then, in its first few months in office, the Reagan Administration
asked Congress to reinstate aid to several countries that had been denied aid under the Carter
Administration because of their poor human rights records, including Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay. See Jacoby, The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF.
1066, 1069 (1986).
21. Describing the significance of the Lefever affair, TamarJacoby wrote: "The hearings were
bitter and highly publicized, and it was evident that what was under review was not so much
Lefever as the Administration's decision to dismantle the Carter policy on human rights." Id.
at 1069-70.
22. E. Abrams, U.S. Dep't of State Memorandum: Reinvigoration of Human Rights Policy
1 (Oct. 26, 1981) (submitted by Deputy Secretary Clark to Secretary Haig) (available through
the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs) (emphasis in original). Elliott Abrams
was nominated and confirmed for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs shortly thereafter. See Schifter, supra note 18, at 18.
UMENTS SUPPLEMENT 12 (1981)
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Congress and in the NGO community soon were locked in battle with
the Reagan Administration over implementation of its professed human rights policy. In particular, for much of its first term, the Reagan
Administration was criticized for applying its policy in a distorted
fashion: 23 invoking accusations of human rights violations against
countries with which the United States government had hostile relations, while disregarding or tolerating abuses committed by United
24
States allies.
While the underlying point of contention involved the evenhandedness-and, more importantly, the integrity-of the Reagan Administration's efforts to promote compliance with human rights standards, public disputes between the NGO community and the
Administration increasingly focused on their respective characterizations of factual conditions. Critics accused the Administration of
exaggerating the extent of abuses in countries like Nicaragua and Cuba
to serve perceived geopolitical interests while understating the extent
and severity of abuses committed by such strategic allies as Turkey
and El Salvador. 25 Administration officials responded in kind, charging
that the Administration's most vocal critics distorted the facts in the
26
opposite direction.
In the early years of President Reagan's first term, these battles
focused primarily on the Administration's policy toward El Salvador.
In the view of the Reagan Administration, the situation prevailing in
El Salvador involved substantial foreign policy stakes. A Marxist insurgency that received support from the Nicaraguan government had
made significant gains in the period shortly before President Reagan
assumed office, and the new Administration was determined to "draw
the line" in El Salvador against what it viewed as further Soviet
27
expansionism in Central America.
23. By the time President Reagan left office in 1989, even his harshest critics in the human
rights community believed that his Administration's implementation of its human rights policy
had become more evenhanded. See Shestack, An Unsteady Focus: The Vulnerabilities of the Reagan
Administration's Human Rights Policy 2 HARv. HUM. RTs. Y.B. 25 (1989). For an analysis of
the evolution of the Reagan Administration's human rights policy, see Jacoby, supra note 20.
24. See, e.g., AMERICAS WATCH, HELSINKI WATCH & LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY: A MIDTERM REVIEW 1 (1982) (charging that Reagan Administration "has cheapened the currency of
human rights by invoking its principles to criticize governments it perceives as hostile to the
United States and by denying or justifying abuses by governments it perceives as friendly to the

United States").
25. See, e.g., Neier, Flimflam on Central America, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1985, at 27, col. 1.
26. See Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1984, at A3, col. 1 (U.S. official charged that "apologists"

were ignoring Cuba's human rights abuses); Abrams, The Myopia of Human Rights Advocates,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1984, at A25, col. 1.
27. The Administration's first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, was an especially vocal
proponent of this view. See D. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 84 (1988).
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This determination translated into a commitment to support the
Salvadoran armed forces in their fight against the insurgents. But the
Salvadoran military's responsibility for massive human rights violations, including the murder of several United States citizens, generated
intense public opposition to increased military aid for El Salvador.
Concern about the human rights situation in El Salvador ran high
in Congress. Nevertheless, most members of Congress were reluctant
to impose a blanket ban on aid to El Salvador, perhaps because many
of them sought to avoid taking responsibility for "losing El Salvador"
in the event that the Salvadoran military was overpowered by Marxist
insurgents. 28 Congress resolved this dilemma by enacting legislation
that required the President to provide, as a condition of continued
United States aid to El Salvador, a biannual certification that certain
human rights conditions had been met in the previous six-month
period. 29 This approach enabled Congress to take a stand in support
of human rights, while shifting to the Administration ultimate responsibility for continuing or ending military aid to El Salvador.
Although this legislation purported to set forth specific preconditions for the continuation of aid to El Salvador, the terms of the
conditions allowed wide latitude for interpretation. 30 During a period
of staggering human rights abuses by Salvadoran forces, the Administration certified every six months that the conditions had been satisfied. The certifications were disingenuous; privately, even Reagan
Administration officials complained that the certification law, by posing an "all-or-nothing" choice with respect to Salvadoran aid, 31 forced
the Administration to mislead Congress.
Throughout this process, NGOs produced extensively documented
reports of ongoing abuses to counter the Administration's
certifications 32 and provided testimony contradicting the Administra28. See id. at 86-87.

29. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113,
§ 728, 95 Stat. 1519 (1981).
30. To continue the flow of aid to El Salvador, the Administration had to certify, inter alia,
that the Salvadoran government was:
-making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized
human rights; and
-achieving substantial control over all elements of its own armed forces, so as to
bring to an end the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens by these
forces.
Id. at § 728(d).
31. Under the certification law, if even one condition was not satisfied, all of the military

aid to El Salvador would be terminated. Id. at § 728(c).
32. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE INEL SALVADOR: A CASE
STUDY: A REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE KILLING OF FOUR U.S. CHURCHWOMEN

IN EL SALVADOR (1982).
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tion's findings at semiannual congressional hearings convened to review
the presidential certifications. 33 The Administration, in turn, made a
high priority of attempting to discredit NGOs' work. When, for
example, Americas Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") copublished a 312-page report on human rights violations
by the Salvadoran government, 34 Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams had his staff
prepare a critique of the report. The resulting analysis made clear that
the object of the critique was to discredit the report, and that the
assignment was rather formidable in light of the high quality of the
work. The memorandum began:

The ACLU-Americas Watch report is an extremely well
prepared, effective documentation of human rights violations
in El Salvador by government forces. Its moderate and clinical
tone contribute to its effectiveness and credibility. The report's careful preparation and general tendency to stick to
either what is credible or what cannot be effectively disproved
make it a tough document to attack. It is, nevertheless, a
document prepared with political objectives and is obviously
35
slanted and totally one-sided in all its presentation.

Others took the lead from the Administration, publishing harsh critiques of NGO reporting on El Salvador. 36 The NGOs that were
criticized responded in print, and the exchanges helped to keep issues
relating to NGO methodology in prominent public view.
The battles over El Salvador set in place a pattern that endured
after public attention drifted to other countries and regions. When,
for example, the focal point of the Reagan Administration's foreign
policy shifted from El Salvador to Nicaragua, and the Administration
sought congressional support for armed insurgents opposing the Sandinista government-known as contras-human rights NGOs produced reports documenting grave abuses committed by the rebels.
The Administration, in turn, charged that the reports lacked credi33. See D. FORSYTHE, supra note 27, at 86.
34. AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE AND THE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REPORT

ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1982) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE-ACLU
REPORT].

35. D. Shaffer, Declassified Memorandum: The ACLU-Americas Watch Committee Report
on Human Rights in El Salvador: A Preliminary Analysis 1 (Feb. 4, 1982) (submitted by Peter
Sarros to Elliott Abrams).
36. See, e.g., Asman, Behind the Human-Rights Tallies, Wall Street J., Feb. 10, 1984, at 26,

col. 4.
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bility, and publicly attacked one of the most prominent reports 37 of
contra violations. 38
During the first term of the Reagan Administration, in particular,
the public battles over facts between the Administration and the
human rights community were heated, harsh, and at times downright
nasty. Their very intensity was a measure of the profound shift in
importance of human rights considerations as a distinct factor in
United States foreign policy during the decade. The intensive scrutiny
of human rights fact-finding-however disingenuous itself-helped
produce improvements in the human rights reporting of NGOs and
39
the United States government.
II. EVALUATING CREDIBILITY
As the costs of being labeled a gross violator of human rights
increased, governments acquired a strong incentive to discredit reports
that placed them (or their allies) in this category. Angry denials by
governments whose rights records were reported and critiques of NGO
fact-finding by the Reagan Administration attracted media attention,
and the press, too, began to scrutinize the credibility of NGO
reporting.
For NGOs, the stakes in surviving such scrutiny could not be
higher. The credibility of their fact-finding is their stock-in-trade.
Broadly stated, the chief objective of human rights NGOs is to
promote compliance with international human rights standards. 40 As
37. R.

BRODY, CONTRA TERROR IN NICARAGUA: REPORT OF A FACT-FINDING MISSION:

SEPTEMBER 1984 -JANUARY 1985 (1985).

38. Elliott Abrams dismissed the Brody report as "bought and paid for by the Sandinistas,"
id. at 8 (in Introduction by Reed Norton), and President Reagan attacked it in a speech delivered
on April 15, 1985:

Just a few weeks ago, the whole world was treated to a so-called "independent
investigation" of charges that the freedom fighters have committed atrocities ...

The report ignored communist brutality, the murder of the Indians and the arrest,
torture and murder of political dissidents. But we really shouldn't be surprised by
that, because, as our State Department discovered and Time Magazine reported, this

so-called independent investigation was the work ofone ofdictator Ortega's supporters,
a sympathizer who has openly embraced Sandinismo and who was shepherded through
Nicaragua by Sandinista operatives.
Id. Brody disputed the Administration's charges, and several other human rights organizations
corroborated Brody's findings. See, e.g., Report of Donald T. Fox, Esq. & Prof. Michael J.
Glennon to the International Human Rights Law Group and the Washington Office on Latin

America Concerning Abuses Against Civilians by Counterrevolutionaries Operating in Nicaragua
(Mar. 1985); AMERICAS WATCH, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY BOTH SIDES IN

NICARAGUA (1985) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR].
39. See Neier Address, supra note 2.
40. The standards most commonly cited in NGO reports are those embodied in customary
law; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, (1ll), U.N. GAOR Res. 7 1,

U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), which was adopted by the United Nations without dissent and
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self-appointed watchdogs, NGOs have no "authority" to compel governments to bring their practices into compliance with those standards;
NGOs can aspire only to persuade governments to respect the rights
of individuals subject to the governments' jurisdictions. To this end,
NGOs appeal to governments believed to be responsible for abuses to
cease the violations. NGOs also frequently marshall external sources
of pressure, such as the intervention of other governments or intergovernmental bodies. Fact-finding lies at the heart of these efforts,
and the fact-finding "works" when it convinces the target audience 4 1
that the published allegations are well founded.
Although critiques of NGO reporting do not reflect a coherent set
of commonly acknowledged standards, it is possible to identify factors
that figure prominently in public assessments of NGO fact-finding.
The most frequently cited criteria fall into two categories. One relates
to the integrity of an NGO's fact-finding methodology; the other takes
account of various factors that are thought to indicate whether the
NGO has an institutional bias-other than a bias in favor of human
purports to have universal application; and human rights conventions which the relevant state
has ratified. Conventions frequently cited on this basis include the InternationalCovenant on Civil
and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc.
A16316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); such regional treaties as the American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OEA/ser. A/16 (English
1975) (entered into force, July 18, 1975); specialized treaties such as the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res.
46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39151 (1984). NGOs that monitor
compliance with the laws of war generally cite applicable provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No.
3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, and the two Protocols to the Conventions:
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, openedfor signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16
I.L.M. 1391, U.N. Doc. A/32/144; and Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
openedfor signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442, U.N. Doc. A/32/144; as well as relevant
provisions of Hague Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land;
Annex to the Convention, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Star. 2277, T.S. No. 539; and Hague Convention No. V, Respecting the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Star.
2310, T.S. No. 540, and customary international law.
41. In addition to the government that is the subject of a report, the target audience may
include foreign governments that can exert influence on the offending government through
sanctions or diplomatic pressure; intergovernmental bodies concerned with human rights; and
the informed "public," whose concern about human rights abuses in a particular country may
trigger policy initiatives. Each of these audiences is influenced by media coverage, and thus the
press also has become an important target audience of human rights NGOs.
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rights42-that may taint the credibility of its conclusions. 43 This
section examines the operative content of both types of criteria and
analyzes the appropriateness of the emerging standards for assessing
credibility. As the following discussion suggests, those standards present substantial opportunities for NGOs to founder on the "credibility
question."
A. Fact-FindingMethodology
Several aspects of the methodology underlying country reports tend
to make even the most meticulous NGOs vulnerable to credibility
challenges.
1. The Effects of Government Secrecy and Intimidation
First, the fact-finding activities of the most prominent human rights
NGOs tend to focus on violations of physical integrity, such as torture,
44
extrajudicial executions, "disappearances," and arbitrary detention.
The facts surrounding reported violations of this sort are rarely beyond
dispute, in large part because the violations themselves are often
deliberately shrouded in secrecy: military forces organize anonymous
"death squads" to kill political opponents under cover of darkness;
agents of the state seize suspected political opponents without judicial
warrant and torture their victims in unauthorized, secret detention
45
centers. ,
42. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6-7 (B.
Ramcharan ed. 1981) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING].
43. In practice, the two types of criteria often converge. Public critiques of NGO reports
often charge that a report's conclusions rest upon information provided by politically-biased
activists in the country under scrutiny. When this criticism is framed to suggest that the NGO
shares its sources' political agenda, it impugns both the NGO's impartiality and the credibility
of its factual conclusions. For an example of this type of critique, see discussion of the Reagan
Administration's efforts to undermine a report on contra violations in Nicaragua, R. BRODY,
supra note 37.
44. There are exceptions. A few NGOs, such as the Geneva-based International Commission
ofJurists, have included analyses of states' compliance with internationally recognized economic,
social, and cultural rights--as well as their compliance with civil and political rights-in their
country reports. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, INDONESIA AND THE RULE
OF LAW: TWENTY YEARS OF 'NEW ORDER' GOVERNMENT (H. Thoolen ed. 1987). In recent
years, some international NGOs traditionally concerned with violations of physical integrity

have broadened their work to encompass such rights as the right of political participation and
freedom of expression. For example, the Washington, D.C.-based International Human Rights
Law Group has developed an election-monitoring project.
Most international NGOs focus on a narrow range of civil and political rights in part because
they believe that international standards relating to economic, social, and cultural rights are not

sufficiently concrete to enable NGOs to determine whether states' practices satisfy the relevant
standards. See Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development,
1 HARV. HUM. RTs. Y.B. 3, 35-38 (1988).
45. See The 'Greek' Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM. RTs. (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights) [para. 31] [hereinafter The 'Greek' Case]; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACTFINDING,

supra note 42, at 68.
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The obstacles to fact-finding posed by the state's nearly exclusive
control of essential information are often compounded by other, related
circumstances. In a context of widespread state lawlessness, for example, witnesses and victims often are afraid to provide testimony to
human rights investigators, fearing retaliation by government forces.
Moreover, a substantial number of countries in which gross violations
are practiced on a systematic basis are closed to foreign investigators.
In many countries, political repression is so severe that independent
human rights monitors either cannot operate internally or do so under
enormous constraints and at great personal risk. And in countries with
serious systematic abuses, a bridled press often does not-because it
46
cannot-provide independent accounts of human rights violations.
Thus, the circumstances in which human rights investigation is
undertaken typically place substantial limitations on fact-finding.
Though such constraints may be unavoidable, their effect on NGO
methodology can invite challenge from a critical audience.

2. The Role of Interpretation
Second, the role of interpretation in the preparation of country
reports contributes to their vulnerability to challenge. While it may
be a truism that there are no "pure facts" and that any attempt to
describe factual conditions entails substantial interpretation, the role
of interpretation is particularly large in the context of human rights
country reports. Because country reports aspire to describe broad
patterns, the finder of fact must attempt not only to verify individual
incidents of abuse, but also to reach more sweeping judgments about
the extent of the violations, the nature of government (and, where
relevant, insurgent) responsibility for the abuses, and the significance
of apparent trends.
Consider, for example, a situation in which data show that a government, which in recent years has been responsible for several thousand political killings each year, now annually executes "only" several
hundred victims. To be meaningful, an account of this trend must
include an analysis of its underlying causes and significance. Otherwise
the NGO's audience cannot assess whether the statistical decline reflects a genuine change in official policy, a decrease in opposition
activity caused by governmental repression, or a shift in the geograph46. For analyses of the impact of systematic human rights violations in El Salvador on press
reporting of violations, see AMERICAS WATCH, PROTECTION OF THE WEAK AND UNARMED:
THE DISPUTE OVER COUNTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EL SALVADOR 8-10 (1984);
AMERICAS WATCH, U.S. REPORTING ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR: METHODOLOGY
AT ODDS WITH KNOWLEDGE 20-24 (1982) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH, METHODOLOGY
AT ODDS WITH KNOWLEDGE].
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ical concentration of abuses to areas relatively inaccessible to human
rights monitors. Similarly, a comparatively small number of political
prisoners in a country may signify a low degree of official repression,
or it may reflect a degree of governmental intimidation substantial
enough to preclude citizens from attempting dissident activity.47
The point is that, however objective an NGO's methodology in
ascertaining the "facts" about alleged human rights violations, its final
conclusions draw upon qualitative interpretation of the data. 48 While
unavoidable, the substantial role of interpretation in human rights
fact-finding leaves room for observers to reach different conclusions
about the significance of even agreed upon facts.
Divergent conclusions about the "same" facts may also reflect differing judgments about a government's degree of moral culpability,
or about the relative efficacy of alternative characterizations in promoting the institutional objectives of the fact-finding organization.
Suppose, for example, that an NGO investigates conditions in a
country that experienced staggering violations in the recent past. The
fact-finder almost surely will find that the worst abuses have abated;
the type of wholesale slaughter associated with Idi Amin's Uganda,
Pol Pot's Cambodia, and East Timor in the years following Indonesia's
invasion does not persist indefinitely. In reporting recent trends in
such countries, the NGO might credit the government for improvement, while urging it to exert still greater efforts to end current
violations. Or, the NGO could condemn the government for continuing abuses, perhaps recognizing that state violence has abated because
the political opposition has been crushed, and that the government
has undertaken earlier positive reforms only when prompted by international condemnation. Though different in tone, both approaches are
consistent with the same "raw facts," and the choice between them

47. See Scoble & Wiseberg, Problems of Comparative Research in Human Rights, in GLOBAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES AND NGO STRATEGIES 152
(Nanda, Scarritt & Shepherd, Jr., eds. 1981) (noting that the degree of repression "necessary"

to achieve a generally intimidating effect varies from one country to the next, depending in part
upon the efficiency of a country's system of communications).
48. In part for this reason, some NGOs have eschewed the recommendation ofseveral scholars
that greater efforts be made to develop quantifiable data relating to human rights conditions
and to apply statistical analyses to the data. A discussion of the relative value and limits of
quantitive analysis in human rights fact-finding is beyond the scope of this Article. For discussion
of this subject, see Bollen, Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of
Human Rights Measures, 1950 to 1984, 8 HuM. RTS. Q. 567 (1986); Claude & Jabine, Editors
Introduction, Symposium: Statistical Issues in the Fieldof Human Rights, 8 HUM. RTs. Q. at 551;
Goldstein, The Limitations of Using QuantitativeData in Studying Human Rights Abuses, 8 HUM.

RTs. Q. 607; Stohl, Carleton, Lopez & Samuels, State Violation of Human Rights: Issues and
Problems of Measurement, 8 HUM. RTs. Q. at 592; see also Rubin & Newberg, StatisticalAnalysis
for Implementing Human Rights Policy, in THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 270 (P. Newberg

ed. 1980).
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may be determined, at least in part, by a calculation of their relative
efficacy in promoting improvement.
3. Applying Abstract Human Rights Standards
A third aspect of human rights fact-finding further increases the
potential for different conclusions to emerge from the same facts: the
investigator must measure facts against an abstract standard. Most
NGOs evaluate states' compliance with internationally recognized human rights standards. 4 9 Some NGOs also assess state practices in light
of protections embodied in domestic law.1° Thus, in seeking to verify
a reported violation, NGOs must attempt to determine both what
actually happened, and whether the facts, under all the attendant
circumstances, constitute a violation of relevant standards. 5 1 These
determinations often require difficult judgment calls, and it is scarcely
surprising that different analysts sometimes reach different judgments
52
about the legality of particular conduct.
49. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FAcT-FINDING, supra note 42 at 6-7. If a state claims the
right to derogate from international human rights standards because of a public emergency, an
NGO's determination must include an assessment of whether the government's action comports
with applicable international standards governing the validity of such derogations, such as those
set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence
of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are
not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or
social origin.
InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, art. 4.
50. International NGOs make reference to domestic law for several reasons. A government
may be more responsive to appeals based on its own national laws than to those based solely on
international standards. Moreover, the laws themselves are an indication of official policy. Finally,
when government officials pervasively and blatantly disregard protections embodied in the laws
of their own state, the pattern itself may reflect official tolerance of human rights abuses.
51. An NGO must also assess whether a particular incident falls within its institutional
mandate. For example, AI seeks the release of "prisoners of conscience," defined as "people
detained for their beliefs, colour, sex, ethnic origin, language or religion who have not used or
advocated violence," and "works for fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners." Al Mandate
in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1989
at inside front cover. Accordingly, when it considers whether to take action on a particular
political prisoner's case, AI must ascertain not only whether the person is detained, but also
whether the detention was based solely on one of the grounds listed above, and whether the
detainee had used or advocated violence.
52. Some of the most impassioned debates over the "facts" of human rights violations between
the Reagan Administration and the human rights community revolved around differing interpretations of relevant international standards. For example, in the early 1980s Americas Watch
criticized the United States government's position that unarmed civilians supporting Salvadoran
guerrillas ("masas") were legitimate military targets (the United States subsequently changed its
position). Americas Watch argued that, pursuant to relevant standards of international humanitarian law, such civilians were not legitimate targets. One effect of this dispute was that
Americas Watch and the United States government reached different conclusions respecting the
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B. InstitutionalCredibility
Recent critiques of NGO fact-finding have focused as much on
indicia of institutional credibility as on methodology. Challenges to
the institutional credibility of NGOs have focused on two charges in
particular.
1. Political "Balance"
The first charge is that a survey of an NGO's work betrays a high
degree of selectivity in the countries that are monitored, and that the
selection is driven by a decided political slant. When applying this
measure, critics often make reference to both the range of countries
which an NGO has scrutinized" 3 and the evenhandedness of the organization's application of international standards to different countries' human rights records. Thus, even NGOs that attempt to monitor
countries of every political orientation have been criticized for "going
easier" on countries of one political shading than another. 4 Sometimes
the apparent disparity has been largely a matter of tone-a difference
in the moral fervor of an NGO's respective condemnations of similar
violations by different governments. But in human rights reporting,
in which shadings of language convey varying levels of opprobrium,
tone is substance.
2. Anti-Government Bias
The second charge is that an NGO's work on a particular country
betrays a political bias against the government and in favor of its
opponents. The criticism often arises with respect to reports that
examine countries in which the most serious abuses occur in a context
of civil war. In these circumstances, government officials have frequently charged that an NGO report is biased if it criticizes only
abuses by government forces, and not those of their armed
adversaries. 55
number of Salvadoran civilians killed in violation of international law; the United States

government's earlier position enabled it to exclude the killings of"masas" from its tally of human
rights victims. See AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE & THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
THIRD SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1983).

53. NGOs have often been criticized for focusing greater attention on right-wing authoritarian
governments than on communist regimes. See, e.g., Ratliff, Call It Amneeia International, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 20, 1989, at A19, col. 2.

54. See, e.g., Peretz, SpecialDispensations,THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 20, 1986, at 43 (accusing
Americas Watch of evaluating practices of the Nicaraguan government with a "less critical eye"
than used to evaluate comparable practices of right-wing governments).
55. While ostensibly citing evidence of an NGO's bias, governments accused of human rights
violations frequently make such charges disingenously to discredit damaging reports.
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This charge played a prominent role in the Reagan Administration's
efforts to discredit human rights reports that documented gross violations by several strategic allies of the United States. Early in its first
term, the Administration began to press the view that, to be credible,
NGOs that report on violations in a country in a state of armed
conflict must monitor the practices of the rebels as well as the gov56
ernment forces.
There are, however, principled reasons for NGOs to monitor violations attributable only to government forces, and most domestic
NGOs, as well as many international NGOs, follow this practice.
These organizations base their work on international human rights
law, which establishes international responsibility for violations only
on the part of governments,' 7 in contrast to the laws of war (also
known as humanitarian law), which generate international responsibility for violations by all sides to an armed conflict. Thus an NGO
that bases its mandate exclusively on international human rights law
is faithful to the law by focusing on government conduct.58 Nevertheless, vigorous efforts by the Reagan Administration to press its
view left a strong imprint on public perceptions. As a result, the
credibility of human rights NGOs is often measured by their "evenhandedness" in monitoring all sides to an armed conflict.
3. Acknowledgment of Contextual Factors
Beyond such considerations as whether NGOs monitor both sides
to an armed conflict or whether they monitor governments of the right
and left with equal vigor, more subtle factors affect public perceptions
of NGOs' credibility. Governments that are the subject of scrutiny as
well as other audiences often evaluate NGO reporting according to its
"fairness" in a particular sense: whether it acknowledges contextual
factors that place violations "in perspective." Thus, for example, the
56. As United States Ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick expressed the Administration's position when criticizing a UN resolution that condemned the Salvadoran government's
human rights record: "Because human rights can be violated by individuals and groups as well
as by governments, the protection of human rights should necessarily have a double focus. It
should take account of all major sources of abuse: violations by government and violations by
private violence, including organized private violence ....
" Press Release, USUN 130 (81),
at 2, reprinted in AMEwcAS WATCH, METHODOLOGY AT ODDS WITH KNOWLEDGE (1982),
supra note 46, at 10. Ambassador Kirkpatrick's view was misleading to the extent that it implied
that violations of human rights law by any party, public or private, generates the same
responsibility under international law. See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN

NORMS AS CusToMARY LAW 170-71 (1989).
57. Although some international human rights conventions contain provisions that address
private conduct, international legal responsibility for violations of the conventions devolves upon
the state parties. See T. MERON, supra note 56, at 170-7 1.
58. If an NGO invokes the laws of war to evaluate government conduct, however, it should
also evaluate the conduct of the government's armed adversaries.
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Israeli government is more likely to credit a report describing its
violations in the West Bank and Gaza if the report acknowledges that
human rights conditions are deplorable in other areas of the Middle
East. 59 Similarly, even if a human rights NGO's mandate does not
extend to monitoring abuses committed by armed rebels, its account
of a government's violations is likely to seem more credible to that
government if the report acknowledges in a more-than-perfunctory
fashion the threat posed by the insurgents. 60 Indeed, human rights
reports that criticize abuses committed by governments responding to
an armed insurgency now routinely acknowledge not only the government's right to respond militarily and, under certain circumstances,
to derogate from some human rights, but also express opprobrium of
violations committed by the insurgents.
While signalling that the NGOs' motive in publicizing government
abuses is not political, these types of "contextual" observations serve
a separate function as well: they anticipate and address the target
government's (or other target audiences') possible inclination to dismiss the NGO's reports as politically motivated, naive, inappropriate,
or irrelevant. By addressing the government's dilemma head on,
NGOs recognize its predicament without accepting the abuses of its
armed opponents as justification for state-sponsored violations of fundamental rights. 6 1
59. Many NGOs adhere to the principle that each government's practices must be measured
only against international standards, and eschew comparisons among countries. Nevertheless,
NGOs sometimes respond to pressures to "put in perspective" their criticism of certain governments by acknowledging the egregiousness of other governments' records. This sort of pressure
tends to be acute with respect to countries that have been the subject of sustained, politically
motivated criticism. However principled an NGO's general refusal to engage in comparisons,
its failure to do so in these situations may be thought to have the ironic effect of actually
encouraging distortions.
60. See Healey & Hoffman, Amnesty Looks First at Vitims, Not Ideologies, N.Y. Times, Apr.
6, 1989, at A30, col. 3 (letter responding to Ratliff, supra note 53, asserting that A] has
condemned practices of guerrilla and nongovernmental forces in a number of countries, even
though its mandate extends only to governmental practices).
61. Similar considerations underlie the increasingly common discussion in human rights
reports of the special pressures faced by new governments in transition from prolonged military
rule to civilian democracy. Governments in this situation frequently inherit a daunting legacy
and face continued military pressure--sometimes in the form of threatened or attempted coupsagainst enforcing a strong human rights policy. Military elements in some countries have
thwarted government efforts to restore the rule of law by obstructing prosecutions of human
rights violators.
By acknowledging these constraints, many human rights reports seek to apportion varying
degrees of moral condemnation to responsible parties, while making clear that the present
government ultimately is responsible for deviations from its obligations under international law.
See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PHILIPPINES: UNLAWFUL KILLINGS BY MILITARY AND
PARAMILITARY FORCES 5-10 (ASA 35/02/88, 1988); AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
PERU AFTER PRESIDENT GARCIA'S FIRST YEAR (1986) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN PERU]; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, VIGILANTES IN THE PHILIPPINES

ix-x (1988).
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Inclusion of textual information to this end reflects a peculiar aspect
of NGO reports: they form part of an ongoing dialogue with the
target government and, often, with other audiences. 62 By acknowledging that the government has committed human rights violations
as a response to circumstances that help explain its behavior, the NGO
has anticipated the next stage in the dialogue-the government's
response-and answered it.
A key point to be made here is that human rights reports are not
merely abstract factual accounts. The reports are advocacy tools, designed to promote change in government practices. As such, their
presentation of facts is designed to respond to factors likely to affect
the report's impact.
Emerging standards used to judge institutional credibility place
somewhat conflicting demands on NGOs concerned with maximizing
the persuasive impact of their reports. In principle, the public judges
NGO reporting as "fair" and "balanced" if the organization measures
every government's record against the same, universal standards; in
practice, however, the perceived fairness or balance of particular reports
often depends upon the extent to which the report takes account of
contextual factors that are peculiar to the country concerned. Thus
public perceptions of "fair" and "balanced" reporting is often a relative
matter, and even NGOs that are genuinely committed to the principle
that human rights fact-finding must be politically neutral face substantial challenges in their efforts to appear so.
To the extent that an NGO's reports explicitly address a current
policy debate, there are even more substantial risks that the report
will be discredited as politically motivated. This dynamic came into
play when United States-based NGOs began to report on human rights
conditions in El Salvador in the early 1980s. As noted earlier, 63 NGOs
tended to gear their presentation of facts to the presidential certifications required by Congress, and took a forthright position opposing
aid. Some of the organizations insisted that their opposition was based
solely on human rights principles, and that they would oppose aid to
any country whose government engaged in systematic violations of
fundamental rights. Still, the very fact that NGOs used their reporting
to support a position that had sweeping political consequences made
them vulnerable to charges of political bias, in part because their
efforts had the effect of bolstering the position of lobbyists who
opposed aid for unabashedly political reasons.
Some NGOs have made deliberate efforts to correct distortions that
have formed part of and been exacerbated by public debate about
62. Interview with Anne Nelson, Executive Director of Committee to Protect Journalists, in
New York City (May 11, 1989).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
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controversial policies. In doing so, they have become even more vulnerable to accusations that they, too, were partisans to the debate.
This phenomenon was especially pronounced during debate over the
Reagan Administration's policy toward Nicaragua. By many accounts,
the Reagan Administration repeatedly, willfully, and grossly exaggerated the human rights violations of the Nicaraguan government to
justify its support of the contras, while understating the extent of contra
violations.64 Some United States-based NGOs responded by not only
setting forth conclusions of fact that contradicted the Administration's
account, but also directly challenging the Administration's
characterizations. 65
At times, this put NGOs in the position of saying in so many
words that however blameworthy the Nicaraguan government's actual
human rights record, it was not as bad as the Reagan Administration
said it was. These statements struck some observers as an apology for
66
the Nicaraguan government and brought on charges of political bias.
The fact that some NGO reports on Nicaragua addressed matters of
United States foreign policy-specifically, the issue whether violations
by the contras were so egregious that United States funding should be
prohibited-provided further ammunition to those who charged that
67
the reporting itself was biased.
C. Appropriateness of Emerging Norms
Although implicit in public critiques of NGO methodology, the
criteria used to evaluate NGO reporting do not reflect a generally
recognized or widely accepted set of professional standards. It is appropriate, therefore, to ask whether NGOs should accept and aspire
to satisfy the de facto standards that have emerged.
64. See Farer, Looking at Nicaragua:The Problematiqueof Impartialityin Human Rights Inquiries,
10 HuM. RTs. Q. 141, 147 (1988); Kondracke, Broken Watch: Human Rights orPolitics?, THE
NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 22, 1988, at 9.
65. See, e.g., AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA: REAGAN, RHETORIC AND
REALITY (1985) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA].

66. See Barnes, The Sandinista Lobby: 'Human rights' groups with a double standard, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 1986, at 11; Kondracke, supra note 64; Nicaragua and Human Rights: A
double standard?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 1986, at 19 [hereinafter Nicaraguaand Human Rights].

67. See Barnes, supra note 66.
While some partisan organizations and individuals did enter the debate over Nicaragua policy

in the guise of human rights monitors, many charges of bias were lodged against NGOs based
on misunderstandings about the international standards that the organizations applied. For
example, some critics of Americas Watch, charging that the organization displayed a "left-wing
bias," apparently believed that its conclusions about several countries' human rights records
reflected different levels of moral outrage about similar violations. But a good deal of the

"evidence" presented by these critics reflected a failure to appreciate distinctions drawn by

Americas Watch on the basis of international law. See Peretz, supra note 54; Mendez, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, June 9, 1986, at 6 (letter to editor by director of Americas Watch responding to
Peretz article); see also, Nicaraguaand Human Rights, supra note 66.
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The appropriateness of at least some of these standards is questionable. An organization that "fails" certain tests of institutional credibility, perhaps because its work is directed only toward right wing
governments, may nonetheless employ meticulous methodology in
establishing the facts it reports.
The question whether emerging standards of institutional credibility
have any bearing on the reliability of NGO reporting, however, may
be largely beside the point. If NGOs hope to be effective, they can
ill afford to flout the standards applied by their target audiences. More
to the point, criticisms of NGO reporting based on charges of institutional bias have had largely beneficial effects. Such criticisms have,
for example, helped prompt many NGOs to monitor serious violations
in countries they previously had ignored. 68 With this development,
the human rights norms embodied in international law have become
more genuinely universal.
There may be, however, some exceptions to the pragmatic view that
NGOs in general should accept, and seek to satisfy, the emerging
standards for assessing institutional credibility. In particular, there are
sound reasons to challenge the view that all NGOs must monitor
guerrilla abuses if they monitor government practices in a country
70
69
wracked by internal armed conflict. For reasons suggested earlier,
the decision to monitor only government practices can be a principled
7
one, and it has been applied by such respected organizations as AI. 1
Nevertheless, governments confronted with an insurgency have frequently charged that a domestic NGO's failure to monitor guerrilla
abuses reflects political bias or even collaboration with the insurgents.
Because such allegations have placed domestic human rights activists
at grave risk, some international NGOs that monitor all sides to
68. The reporting activities of many international NGOs formerly betrayed a stronger geographical or geopolitical slant than they do today. While the reasons for the earlier pattern
vary-some NGOs undoubtedly are biased--several factors have been especially important. In
deciding how to allocate limited resources, NGOs have sometimes focused disproportionately
on countries where they believed they could have the greatest impact. Also, NGOs have failed
to monitor many "closed" countries, believing that information necessary to prepare a credible

report is not available.
In recent years many international NGOs have taken deliberate steps to correct the earlier
imbalance in their reporting. For example, as noted in Part III, NGOs have made increasing

attempts to monitor "closed" countries by relying on credible refugee testimony. See infra text
accompanying notes 96, 127. Perhaps, too, as the influence of the human rights movement has
become more apparent, some NGOs have readjusted their estimation of which governments are
likely to be responsive to their work.
For an excellent analysis of the factors that have accounted for NGO "blind spots," see Cohen,
People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception, 9 HuM. R'rs. Q. 447 (1987).
69. As noted earlier, however, an NGO that monitors government forces' violations of the
laws of war should monitor violations of insurgents as well.
70. See Part 11B2, supra.
71. Al is considering expanding its mandate to include monitoring of guerilla practices.
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armed conflicts have vigorously defended the integrity of domestic
7 2
NGOs' decision to monitor only government abuses.
D. Improving Credibility
If it is desirable to accept most of the criteria that have been invoked
to judge institutional credibility, NGOs will continue to face substantial challenges in their efforts to satisfy those "standards." As the
preceding discussion suggests, NGOs may risk diminishing their
credibility if they combine their reporting activities with an activist
stance on a current policy debate or address the political context
surrounding the abuses they chronicle. Yet both approaches serve
important institutional goals of human rights organizations.
To the extent that NGO reporting is influenced by advocacy concerns, the organizations would be well advised to take measures to
minimize the potential threat to their credibility. They should, for
example, ensure that their reporting reflects consistent application of
international standards. This means that NGOs should be able to
explain any apparent variation in their conclusions about different
governments' violations-including differences in tone-by reference
to variations in factual conditions.
Most suggestions for how NGOs can improve the credibility of
their reporting have focused on methodological considerations. Some
observers have advocated the development of uniform methodological
standards, arguing that adherence to such standards would increase
the reliability and credibility of NGO reporting." 3 The most influential
NGOs generally have not acted upon these suggestions, and the factfinding activities of local human rights NGOs vary considerably from
one country to another and even among NGOs within a country. Many
international NGOs have not even prescribed formal, detailed, standardized fact-finding methodologies for use within their own

organizations .

4

72. See, e.g., LAwYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 6-7 n. 19. While
publicly defending the methodology of such domestic monitors, international NGOs often
privately urge their endangered colleagues to consider monitoring guerrilla abuses, suggesting
that it will increase the monitor's credibility and therefore reduce the risks they face. International
NGOs increasingly feel obliged to monitor guerrilla abuses themselves.
73. See, e.g., Claude, supra note 48; THOOLEN & VERSTAPPEN, HUMAN RIGHTS MISSIONS:
A STUDY OF THE FACT-FINDING PRACTICE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, (1986);

Zeiter, Zunzunegui & Quiroga, Guidelinesfor Field Reporting of Basic Human Rights Violations, 8
HUM. RTS. Q. 628 (1986).
74. Some limited exceptions exist. The International Human Rights Law Group has, for
example, published guidelines for election-monitoring delegations. See L. GARBER, GUIDELINES
FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVING (1984). Prison Watch, a project of Human Rights
Watch, has developed a standard "checklist" for use by delegates investigating prison conditions
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A variety of factors account for NGOs' general reluctance to develop
standardized methodologies. Most importantly, many human rights
professionals believe that the nature of the human rights violations
they monitor requires broad flexibility in fact-finding strategies. 7 5 As
noted earlier, NGO fact-finding has focused on abuses which governments deliberately cloak in secrecy.76 Many human rights professionals
believe that adopting rigid methodological standards would limit their
ability to adapt their fact-finding efforts to the particular constraints
of particular circumstances, 77 and could preclude them from undertaking effective advocacy with respect to countries that engage in the
78
most severe and systematic abuses.
In addition, some human rights professionals believe that the articulation of general fact-finding standards inadvertently could increase
the risks faced by domestic human rights monitors. Such monitors
frequently work under conditions of extreme danger, and government
in foreign countries on behalf of the project. Al has developed a standard questionnaire for use
in interviewing former detainees; however, AI's research staff are not required to use it.
Some organizations that have not prescribed uniform methodological standards have nonetheless made substantial efforts to train and/or supervise their research staff in fact-finding techniques. For example, Human Rights Watch has sponsored in-house training sessions on factfinding techniques.
Al seeks to ensure rigorous standards mainly through a multilevel review process. A regional
supervisor presses the principal researcher to substantiate and defend her or hisconclusions.
Higher levels of review help ensure consistency from one Al report to another. In practice, the
high-level review process fosters the sort of cross-fertilization among Al's different regional
departments that promotes uniform standards within the organization. Research staff say that,
beyond their immediate effect with respect to specific reports, these institutional checks inculcate
the researchers with a "habitual caution," and a sense of "prudence as to the likely factualness
of evidence." Interviews with research staff of Amnesty International, in London (May 31-June
1, 1989) [hereinafter Al Staff Interview].
75. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FAcT-FINDING, suPra note 42, at vii-ix, 2; Weissbrodt &
McCarthy, Fact-Finding by InternationalNongovernmental Human Rights Organizations, 22 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Weissbrodt].
76. See Part IIAI, supra.
77. NGOs often rely upon variations in language characterizing alleged human rights violations to signal the level of certainty surrounding each account included in a report. An NGO,
for example, would apply more rigorous evidentiary standards to a report which it publicly
characterized as "credible" or "reliable" than to one described as "unconfirmed," or simply "a
report." It would apply its most rigorous standards of proof to accounts which it presented as
fact.

Widely-respected NGOs such as Al, Human Rights Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights typically do not even cite an alleged violation as a "report" unless their staff, on
the basis of their own research, have concluded that the report is probably true. According to
one Al researcher, an allegation that is publicly characterized as a "report" has been judged by
Al research staff to be a "probable fact." Al Staff Interview, supra note 74.
78. Some analysts have observed that there is an inverse relationship between the severity of
abuses in a country and access to information about the violations. One writer expresses the
point this way: "[I1t
is virtually an axiom that the more repressive the regime, the more difficult

it makes access to information about its human rights atrocities to researchers (or anyone else)."
Goldstein, supra note 48, at 617.
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attacks on the credibility of their methodology often heighten those
risks, serving in effect as a public "death warrant." In this setting,
some human rights professionals fear that governments might cite,
with dangerous consequences, a domestic NGO's failure to adhere to
79
established uniform standards to harm the organization's credibility.
Any such effect would not only be dangerous, it would be unwarranted. Circumstances surrounding human rights violations vary considerably from one country to the next, and possibilities for investigating reported violations vary accordingly. This extreme variation
makes it impossible for domestic monitors everywhere to aspire to the
same methodological standards.

E. Threshold Standardsof Credibility
While there are valid reasons for eschewing narrow methodological
standards, NGOs should nonetheless aspire to the highest standards
possible under prevailing circumstances. Indeed, their institutional
objectives would be defeated if their reports failed to persuade their
target audiences that the factual conclusions were well-founded. To
meet this "burden of persuasion," each report must satisfy a threshold
standard of credibility.
A paradigm for evaluating whether NGO methodology strikes a
proper balance between the need for flexibility and appropriate expectations of rigor is suggested by the evidentiary rules applied by international tribunals. Recognizing the peculiar difficulties surrounding
fact-finding in transnational settings, international judicial tribunals
have generally judged it necessary to use flexible evidentiary standards,80 and have permitted liberal recourse to inferential and circumstantial evidence. 81 Nevertheless, international tribunals have also rec-

79. But see Zeiter, supra note 73 (arguing that adherence to uniform methodological standards
would help insulate domestic monitors from attack).
80. See, e.g., Pinson Case (France v. United Mexican States French/Mexican Claims Commission) 5 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 327, 414 (1952). International tribunals have eschewed rigid
evidentiary standards in part because the territorial control a state exercises within its borders
may leave another state "unable to furnish direct proof" that a violation has been committed in
the territory of the first state. Corfiu Channel Reports (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18; see also Ireland
v. United Kingdom, 23-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1976), reprinted in 58 I.L.R. 188, at 264
(1980) [hereinafter Ireland v. UK].
81. In a 1988 case involving allegations that the government of Honduras was responsible
for an involuntary disappearance, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that
"[c]ircumsrantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances,
because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt [by the responsible governmental
authorities] to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the
victim." Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 4, at para. 131
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ognized that, notwithstanding the special evidentiary problems which
claimants before them face, petitioners alleging violations of internas2
tional law bear an initial burden of persuasion.
Once the claimant makes out a prima facie case, however, tribunals
often shift the burden of proof to the respondent.8 3 If the respondent
fails to produce evidence rebutting the claimant's allegations, the
tribunal may draw inferences that are adverse to the respondent's
case.8 4 International tribunals have recognized that the justification
for applying this rule is especially compelling when the respondent
fails to produce evidence exclusively within its control. 85
Although NGOs sometimes draw certain inferences from a government's response to their reports, 86 they generally have not pressed
the position that a government's failure to produce evidence rebutting a "prima facie case" established by the organization should
be taken, its itself, as evidence of the truth of the alleged
facts.8 7 More typically, NGOs have acknowledged that they
lack the capacity to verify every detail of accounts included in
their reports, but have asserted that they have developed sufficient evidence of serious abuses to require the government to
(July 29) [hereinafter Velasquez Rodriguez Case]. The Court made clear that its analysis had
application to human rights cases generally. See id., paras. 133-35.
As the discussion in Part IIIC makes clear, human rights professionals make substantial use
of inferential and circumstantial evidence in reaching findings of fact in general country reports.
See infra text accompanying notes 116, 153-160. Such evidence, which is often compelling in
itself, is used to supplement the direct evidence that is the foundation of country reports.
82. Wittenberg, La theorie des preuves devant les jurisdictions internationales, 56 (II)
RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 48 (1936).
83. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 324 (1953).

84. See U.S. on behalf of Parker, Claimant v. The United Mexican States (Docket #127),
(United States-Mexico General Claims Commission, Mar. 31, 1926), reprintedin 21 Am. J.
INT'L L. 174, 177 (1927) [hereinafter Parker].
85. Id. at 178-79; Ultrasystens Inc. v. Iran concurring opinion of Richard M. Mosk, (IranUnited States Claims Tribunal, Mar. 4, 1983), reprintedin 71 I.L.R. 663, 678-79 (1986).
86. As elaborated in Part IIIB, a government's response to violations is itself an important
part of its human rights record. See infra text accompanying notes 13 1-135. In this respect, the
nature of a government's response to information about violations presented to it by an NGO
would be relevant to the organization's assessment of the government's human rights record.
87. The analogy to international tribunals should not be overdrawn. International tribunals
have judged it appropriate to draw adverse inferences from a respondent state's failure to adduce
evidence rebutting a petitioner's allegations in part because states bear a responsibility to
cooperate in the production of evidence when they are parties to litigation before international

tribunals. See Parker,supra note 84, at 174, 177. This rationale would not, of course, be present
with respect to NGO fact-finding activities. But see AWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DETENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WORKERS AND LAWYERS FROM
THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND CONDITIONS OF DETENTION AT KETZIOT 18 (1988) (in the
absence of public charges of illegal activity, Lawyers Committee concludes that Israeli military
authorities have exceeded permissible standards in cases involving detention of human rights
workers and lawyers).
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take appropriate action, 88 including the institution of an impartial
investigation.8 9
This approach seems fundamentally sound. While flexible evidentiary standards are appropriate to NGO human rights fact-finding
methodology, NGO reports should make out a prima facie case for
their factual allegations by developing highly probative-if inconclusive-evidence. If the NGO's methodology is persuasive, the government responsible for alleged violations is likely to face substantial
pressure to "answer for itself," while the concerned public is unlikely
to accept a bald denial as an adequate response.
III. FACT-FINDING METHODOLOGY: COUNTRY REPORTS
Although variations in fact-finding circumstances make it impossible to identify uniformly applicable methodological standards, the
leading NGOs have developed considerable expertise in overcoming
commonly encountered challenges to ensure the reliability of their
fact-finding. This section examines the methodological strategies that
these NGOs have adopted to develop at least prima facie evidence of
human rights violations and, where possible, virtually conclusive
corroboration.
For purposes of analysis, the discussion is limited to fact-finding
inquiries that (1) focus on a narrow band of human rights violationstorture, extrajudicial execution, disappearances and arbitrary arrest,
and detention; (2) involve an on-site investigation-known in NGO
parlance as a fact-finding "mission;" 90 and (3) culminate in the publication of a country report. Although considerations relating to the
composition of a fact-finding delegation, the length of its investigation, and other logistical matters may have important implications for
the credibility of a human rights report, they are beyond the scope of
this Article. 9' The following discussion focuses, instead, on the nature
of evidence gathered by NGO fact-finders. It evaluates the relative
88. NGOs sometimes take a similar approach in presenting information about apparently

widespread abuses to a government on a confidential basis. An Al research staff member described
the logic behind one such communication this way: "We're saying, in effect, we've collected
information [about alleged violations]; prima facie it's substantial; we don't believe every word
of it; we think it's your obligation to do something." AI Staff Interview, jrpra note 74. In the
communication, Amnesty International had sought clarification of reported facts from the
government, and had requested the government to conduct an impartial investigation.
89. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PHILIPPINES:
A COUNTRY IN CRISIS ii-iii (1983).

90. Information gathered during an on-site investigation, however critical to the ultimate
findings of fact set forth in a country report, typically represents a fraction of the total research
effort. The mission itself is preceded by substantial preparatory research. Moreover, once a
delegation has completed an on-site inquiry, it generally continues to monitor conditions from
afar so that it can update its information until publication of the final report.
91. For a discussion of these and related considerations, see Weissbrodt, supra note 75.
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probative value of different types of evidence, and assesses the impact
of various fact-finding techniques on the credibility of an NGO's
factual conclusions.
A. Direct Evidence
The leading international NGOs generally regard direct evidencetestimony of victims or eyewitnesses--as highly probative; such evidence forms the bedrock of the prototypical NGO report on human
rights conditions in a country. Some human rights professionals will
not, as a matter of principle, use hearsay accounts of human rights
violations. 92 Eyewitness and victim testimony is not, however, persuasive in itself; the probative value of direct testimony turns largely
upon the circumstances and manner in which it is obtained, including
the process used to "select" witnesses, the conditions under which they
are interviewed, and the corroboration obtained.
1. Identifying Potential Witnesses
Several overarching goals, each designed to maximize the evidentiary value of direct testimony, guide human rights investigators in
identifying interviewees who can furnish direct evidence of violations.
a. Avoiding Politically-Biased Selection Criteria
First, NGOs seek to ensure that the selection process does not
produce testimony that is politically motivated or otherwise biased.
This risk may be present, for example, if NGOs seek assistance in
identifying potential witnesses from persons or entities politically
opposed to the government or the rebel group whose practices are
93
under scrutiny.
92. Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, describes an experience he
had on a fact-finding mission in Cuba to illustrate why he adopts this position. Neier had been

told by six prisoners in the punishment wing of one Cuban prison that a particular prisoner had
been hanged in that wing. Each one described the hanging as having occurred in a manner
inconsistent with the possibility of suicide. Neier eventually spoke with a prisoner who had
been in the punishment wing for a long time and who had actually shared a cell with the
deceased prisoner. When asked why he had been in the punishment wing so long, the prisoner

explained that he was being punished for murder because he had not intervened when his
cellmate hanged himself. Several factors lent his account credibility. First, Neier was able to
corroborate that the prisoner had been in the punishment wing since the date of the deceased
prisoner's death. Second, the prisoner was visibly angry that he was being punished for not
intervening in his cellmate's suicide. Transcript of Human Rights Watch Training Session, Jan.

4, 1989 [hereinafter Training Session Transcript].
93. As discussed above, the controversy surrounding a 1985 report on abuses committed by
the insurgents opposing the Nicaraguan government, Contra Terror in Nicaragua, highlights the
importance of this issue. See R. BRODY, supra note 37. The Reagan Administration sought to
discredit the report by charging that the Nicaraguan government selected supposed victims
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Sometimes, however, the richest sources of information about potential witnesses and the best witnesses themselves may be-or may
appear to be-politically biased. Because repressive governments persecute in particular their perceived or actual opponents, human rights
organizations would lose the benefit of much victim testimony if they
excluded as interview subjects persons who appeared to be politically
biased against their government. When interviewing such witnesses,
the finder of fact can attempt to ensure that she is not "taken in" by
fabricated or exaggerated allegations of abuse--as she would with any
94
witness-by seeking persuasive corroboration.
b. Obtaining Representative Testimony
Second, human rights investigators seek to avoid selection procedures that produce a skewed picture of overall patterns of violations
in a country. When possible, NGOs draw upon a broad range of
sources to help identify potential witnesses. 95 Input from multiple
sources helps minimize distortions that might be built into any particular source's contribution.
If circumstances do not permit access to witnesses whose testimony,
taken as a whole, can present a comprehensive picture of relevant
patterns, the fact-finder must assess the limitations of various witnesses' testimony, and convey the effect of those limitations on the
conclusions reached in a final report. When, for example, Africa Watch
undertook its first investigation of violations of the laws of war in
Angola and was unable to enter the country itself, it sent an investigator to refugee sites in two neighboring countries. This enabled the
investigator to reach broader conclusions than would have been possible had she visited only one of the sites, since the refugees in the
two countries had fled different border regions of Angola. She was
interviewed by the report's author, and that the Nicaraguan government furnished the investigator's transportation to interview sites. The author of the report asserted in response that he
had financed the investigation himself; that on the few occasions when he had relied on
government-furnished transportation, he was taken to sites that he had selected, and that he
was not accompanied when he sought out witnesses. See id.
94. One potential advantage of interviewing clearly partisan sources is the possibility of

eliciting "admissions against interest." This and other techniques for establishing the credibility
of witness testimony are examined below.
95. Sources used to identify potential witnesses often include domestic organizations that
monitor human rights conditions; church organizations that receive reports of human rights
violations; lawyers who represent victims of abuse and lawyers' groups that organize legal services

for human rights victims; academic research centers that monitor human rights; international
relief organizations whose staff have frequent contact with victims of abuse; organizations, such

as trade unions, whose members are special targets of persecution; and press accounts reporting
instances of alleged violations. Introductions to victims from persons in the first three categories
may enable NGO researchers to interview persons who would not trust a foreign investigator
without assurances from a trusted local monitor.
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careful, nonetheless, to confine her conclusions to the regions of Angola
96
with respect to which she had obtained substantial direct testimony.
An NGO's ability to gauge the representativeness of witness testimony is also a function of the type of witnesses it seeks out. A
delegation investigating reports of the routine torture of political
detainees would, for example, be better able to assess the extent of
torture if it sought out former detainees recently released from detention than if it sought out only persons who claimed to have been
tortured when detained. Using this approach, an AI delegation that
visited the Philippines in 1973 interviewed 103 former political detainees; of these, seventy-one provided credible testimony that they
had been abused. Had the delegates interviewed only former detainees
who claimed to have been tortured, they would have lost a valuable
means of gauging the representativeness of the reported allegations.
c. Time Period Covered
Third, NGOs generally seek witnesses who can provide testimony
about recent practices. Otherwise, the responsible government or insurgent force might dismiss the report's allegations as outdated.
How recent should witness testimony be? Generally, NGOs tend
to focus on the year preceding publication of their reports, concentrating on the latter half of the year. Because, however, it is relatively
difficult to obtain and corroborate recent direct testimony about abuses
in a closed country, reports on such countries often cover a longer
period, perhaps reaching back several years. Also, NGOs often cover
a longer period in their first major report on a country-or on the
record of the current government of a country-than they do in
subsequent reports. In these reports, NGOs often seek to present a
broad overview of long-term trends in a country, 97 while in subsequent
reports they are more likely to update the earlier reports.
Both the nature and degree of public controversy surrounding a
country's human rights record may affect the period covered in a
report. For example, the considerable controversy surrounding the
Reagan Administration's policy toward El Salvador in the early
1980s--as well as the Administration's claims that recent human
rights initiatives were reducing levels of state-sponsored violence in
El Salvador-prompted NGOs to provide highly "current" information
96. SeeAFRICA WATCH,

ANGOLA: VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY BOTH SIDES

3-4

(1989) [hereinafter AFRICA WATCH, ANGOLA].
97. For examples of such reports, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SOMALIA: A LONG-TERM
HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS (AFR 52/27/88, 1988) [hereinafter AI, SOMALIA]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UGANDA: THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 1986-1989 (1989); ASIA WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR (1988) [hereinafter ASIA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INDONESIA].
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to avoid having their conclusions dismissed as irrelevant in light of
recent developments. Also, because some NGOs produced reports on
conditions in El Salvador to counter the Administration's semiannual
certifications to Congress on this subject, 98 the NGOs' reports were
geared to six-month intervals.
In many contexts, "watershed" developments-a change in government, the lifting of martial law, the beginning of a ceasefire coupled
with implementation of a political amnesty--are presumed or thought
likely to affect the state of human rights observance in a country. In
these situations a country report released after the benchmark event
has occurred may be discounted if it purports to describe current
conditions but does not cover developments following the critical
event.
d. Size of Sample Group
Fourth, human rights investigators seek to obtain a large enough
sample of direct testimony on the subject of their inquiry to enable
them to reach judgments about overall patterns of abuse 99 and to
support their final conclusions. 100 In practice, human rights investigators often have to balance this objective against that of guarding
against skewed conclusions. It is important for NGOs to obtain as
much direct testimony as possible about particular abuses addressed
in their final reports, and this may require researchers to make concerted efforts to locate persons capable of providing such testimony.
But efforts to avoid reaching skewed conclusions often involve the use
of random selection criteria, which may yield an inadequate data base
for conclusions about a particular form of abuse.
An investigation of conditions in Cambodia undertaken by the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in November 1984, illustrates
how one delegation attempted to resolve these competing objectives.
The Committee was unable to secure permission to enter Cambodia,
98. Seesupra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
99. When, for example, Jemera Rone conducted interviews of Angolan refugees in a study
undertaken for Africa Watch, she was able to interview a sufficiently large pool of refugees to
determine that patterns of abuse varied from one area to another, suggesting that the violations,
while widespread, did not reflect a centrally-directed plan. Training Session Transcript, supra
note 92.
100. For examples of numbers of witnesses interviewed for country reports, see AFRICA
WATCH, ANGOLA, supra note 96 (over 80 refugees interviewed); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR

HuMAN RIGHTS, SEEKING SHELTER: CAMBODIANS IN THAILAND (1987) (approximately 90
displaced persons interviewed).
Considerations addressed in Part ILIA1, supra, help explain why NGOs have not developed
"rules of thumb" about the appropriate number of interviews for an on-site investigation. A rule
on the appropriate number of interviews based upon an "open" country in which identification
and location of alleged victims is relatively easy, could effectively preclude NGOs from producing
reports about "closed" countries.
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and its on-site investigations were conducted along areas of the ThaiCambodian border where some quarter-of-a-million Cambodian exiles
were settled. Each settlement was administered by civilian leaders of
armed factions opposing the Cambodian government, then called the
People's Republic of Kampuchea ("PRK"). In identifying exiles who
could provide testimony on PRK violations,10 1 the delegation avoided
working through the civilian administrators, who could not be considered disinterested parties with respect to a study of PRK practices.
Instead, the delegates began the selection process by interviewing new
Cambodian arrivals as they were registered in the administrative headquarters of the camps, before they could be influenced by any collective
form of indoctrination.
New arrivals were asked about the reasons for their flight to the
border and where they had lived before their journey. Answers to these
questions helped the delegation gauge the relative extent of political
persecution as a cause of flight.10 2 Further inquiries about the witnesses' personal experiences helped the delegates assess the extent and
geographical patterns of practices such as political imprisonment. 103
Once the delegates had interviewed large numbers of recent arrivals,
they made concerted efforts to identify people who could provide
testimony about particular abuses which, on the basis of the random
interviews, appeared to be common.
2. Circumstances of Interviews
Like the witness-selection process, circumstances surrounding an
interview can play an important role in ensuring the reliability of
direct testimony. Many human rights professionals conduct all interviews of victims and eyewitnesses outside the presence of third persons
to ensure that the witness' testimony is not inhibited or otherwise
influenced by others. 104 This approach also enables the interviewer to
attempt to corroborate a witness' allegations by separately interviewing
other witnesses to the same incident.
Despite the general benefits associated with private interviews,
many NGOs have avoided adopting an inflexible rule in this regard.
101. The Lawyers Committee delegation, of which the author was a member, also investigated

abuses committed by two armed factions opposing the PRK.
102. The approach had obvious, but unavoidable, limitations; persons fleeing Cambodia are
themselves a self-selected subgroup of the Cambodian population, and the delegates took account
of this in evaluating the testimony they obtained.
103. Although the screening method provided a crude means of gauging the extent of certain
patterns of abuse in Cambodia, few alternatives were available. No human rights NGOs operated
in Cambodia, nor, at the time, were there other reliable sources who were in a position to place
individual allegations of abuse in a broader perspective.
104. For example, interviewing witnesses in a group setting may encourage witnesses to
"grandstand" for the "audience." Training Session Transcript, supra note 92.
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At times, the presence of a third person during an interview can be
helpful; a traumatized victim of torture may, for example, be more
comfortable speaking to a stranger if a familiar, trusted intermediary
is present.
Even if conducted in private, an interview can be compromised by
the nearby presence of others. This risk often arises when a fact-finding
delegation seeks to interview residents of refugee settlements. Sometimes the host-country government attempts to impose the requirement that its security forces accompany the delegation as a condition
of access to the camps. NGOs generally try to avoid this condition.
The security forces of the host country are sometimes responsible for
abuse of refugees, 105 and their presence in the vicinity of an NGO's
interviews can be intimidating.10 6 Even the appearance of a delegation
arriving at refugee camps with an official escort may lead camp residents to believe that the delegation is affiliated with the host country's
government, and this perception may affect witnesses' willingness to
07
speak candidly. 1
3. The Interview
Testimony of eyewitnesses and victims is more valuable than hearsay
allegations because the finder of fact has an opportunity to test and,
through direct observation, to assess the credibility of persons who
purport to have direct knowledge of critical facts. Also, the interviewer
is able to elicit, through highly specific questions, the sort of detailed
information necessary to a credible inquiry. The value of a witness'
testimony, then, turns in large measurb on the role and skills of the
interviewer.
At the outset, the way an interviewer presents himself and the
nature of the organization he represents' 08 can affect a witness' inclination to be forthcoming and honest. Witnesses are under no obligation to speak to NGO investigators at all or, if they do, to speak
105. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGE DENIED: PROBLEMS IN THE
PROTECTION OF VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIANS IN THAILAND AND THE ADMISSION OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES INTO THE UNITED STATES (1989); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, SEEKING SHELTER: CAMBODIANS IN THAILAND (1987).

106. Training Session Transcript, supra note 92, at 13-14.
107. Id.
108. This introduction often includes a statement making clear the fact that the NGO is
non-partisan; that it is concerned solely with human rights and is not affiliated with any political
organization, party or other entity, or with any government. See id. at 12; Al Staff Interview,

supra note 74. Even when asked their views on political issues, NGO researchers should make
clear that their organization does not take a position on such issues, and is solely concerned

with human rights. See Training Session Transcript, supra note 92. In some situations, it may
be important for an interviewer to make clear that the witness should expect no "reward"-such
as admission to the United States as a refugee-for providing information or particular answers

to questions.
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the truth. Thus, information presented by an interviewer respecting
his purpose in speaking to the witness, the use that will be made of
the testimony, and conditions of confidentiality may have a significant
effect on the witness' disposition to cooperate.
Early on, the interviewer should make clear that the final product
of the interview will be a public report. At some point, the interviewer
must ask the witness if she is willing to allow her testimony to be
used and, if so, whether she is willing to be identified by name in the
report. 109
Detailed biographical questions are best left until rather late in an
interview. 110 Discomfort about providing personal information to a
total stranger is a universal phenomenon, and is likely to be especially
pronounced when the witness has been a victim of, or eyewitness to,
abuses committed under circumstances that prevail at the time of the
interview.
More generally, it is not desirable to begin an interview by asking
a witness especially sensitive questions. It would, for example, be
unproductive-as well as insensitive-to begin an interview by saying,
"I'd like to find out about the reasons for your son's death. Was he a
guerrilla?" A more seasoned interviewer would begin the interview
with relatively unstressful questions, and would raise the subject of
the son's death at an appropriate point in the subsequent discussion.
Then, she might ask the witness, "How many children do you have?"
and then, "Are they all still alive?" '
The interviewer's questions should generally be open-ended, and in
other respects (including the use of a nonjudgmental tone of voice)
should avoid suggesting that a particular answer to a question is the
"right" one. Still, an interviewer must at times ask highly specific
questions to elicit detailed information about alleged violations. If,
for example, the scope of her inquiry includes arbitrary detention, the
interviewer must, when interviewing former detainees, ask whether
the interviewees ever saw or requested to see a lawyer while detained.
If not, why not? If a detainee had a lawyer, did the lawyer ever attempt
to see her in detention?
Each of these questions must be answered before the interviewer
can determine whether the detainee was actually denied the opportu109. NGOs sometimes omit a witness' name and/or identifying details from a report even
when the witness authorizes their publication; the interviewer may realize that, even though she
has explained to the witness how the testimony will be used, the latter may not be in a position
to appreciate the implications and possible risks of being cited in a publicly released human
rights report that officials of the witness' government will read.
110. NGO researchers seek biographical data in part because such information enables the
researcher to analyze demographic patterns of victimization.
111. Interview with Jemera Rone, Counsel to Americas Watch, in New York City (Way 11,
1989) [hereinafter Rone Interview].
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nity to meet with counsel while detained. Still other questions must
be answered before the interviewer can determine whether such a denial
constituted a violation of international standards respecting the right
to counsel.
Experienced interviewers make substantial use of open-ended followup questions to elicit critical information. An especially useful question is, "How do you know?" Answers to this are often invaluable
indices of a witness' credibility. 112 For example, when responding to
this question, a witness who asserted that a particular military unit
was responsible for murdering a civilian might establish his credibility
by making clear that (1) he was an eyewitness and was standing close
enough to the incident to have been able to observe key details; and
(2) he recognized the perpetrators because they were stationed in the
witness' community and had regular contact with local residents. 113
In contrast, the testimony should be discredited as hearsay if the
witness replies to the interviewer's question, "My mother told me."
"How do you know?" and other follow-up questions can also help
a researcher determine whether an alleged abuse includes all of the
elements of a human rights violation. For example, the question,
"How do you know he was killed?" may elicit the response, "I saw
his corpse at the funeral." This answer helps establish an essential fact:
the death of the alleged victim. Similarly, the question, "How do you
know she was abducted by government troops?" might elicit the
response, "I saw some soldiers seize her and force her into a jeep, and
then they drove away in the direction of the local military detachment." This answer would help establish a key element of a forced
disappearance-abduction by agents of the state.
This form of questioning can also elicit information that is susceptible to corroboration. If, for example, a witness to an extrajudicial
execution asserts that the victim was killed by members of a particular
military unit, her answer to the follow-up question, "How do you
112. One delegation described how it used this type of questioning to determine the rate of
political detention in a country on the basis of former detainees' testimony:
In many cases, witnesses were able to offer credible bases for their estimates of the
extent of certain practices. For example, our estimates of the extent of detention on
political grounds are based in part on estimates of populations at specific prisons by
former political prisoners. A number of these prisoners had a persuasive basis for their
estimates, such as prison lists posted in the jail kitchens or daily roll calls. Additionally,
when we were able to (separately) interview a number of persons who had been
detained at the same facility, their various estimates tended to be in the same range.
LAwYERs COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, KAMPUCHEA: AFTER THE WORST vii (1985)
[hereinafter KAMPUCHEA: AFrER THE WORST].
113. While the witness in this example would have established his credibility in the sense
that he persuasively demonstrated that he was in a position to know what he claimed to know,
a researcher still should attempt to corroborate the witness' allegations. Techniques for this sort
of effort are examined below. See Part IIIA4, infra text accompanying notes 120-125.
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know the perpetrators belonged to that unit?" might include a description of the uniforms and weapons of the perpetrators. The investigator would be able to corroborate whether the description matched
the uniforms and weapons of the unit identified as responsible, and
she might also be able to ascertain whether that unit was operating
in the vicinity of the alleged incident at the relevant time.
Relentless follow-up questions also help a researcher bridge cultural
or other gaps in communication. Human rights investigators travel
throughout the world, and interview people whose concepts of time,
space, and other factors may differ from those of the investigators.
While these differences cannot be overcome entirely, their potentially
distorting effects can be substantially minimized through extensive,
4
detailed questioning. 11
Professional human rights investigators constantly draw upon their
expertise to help them fashion questions that are likely to elicit critical
information. A person investigating violations of the laws of war in a
country wracked by civil conflict might, for example, ask witnesses
who were displaced by combat, "Where were you born?" rather than,
"Where are you from?" In response to the latter question, the witness
might tell the interviewer the name of the town where she was born,
or she might answer by naming the last town in which she lived. In
contrast, once the witness answered the former question, the interviewer could then ask follow-up questions to ascertain the witness'
subsequent patterns of movement and dislocation, and, importantly,
the reasons for each move. The witness' replies may include descriptions of war-related incidents, such as bomb attacks on civilian communities by government forces or deprivation of food by insurgents,
that help the interviewer to assess the geographical patterns of violations of the laws of war. 115
NGO interviewers draw upon their knowledge of country conditions
to fashion questions likely to elicit information that witnesses may be
114. One delegation interviewing displaced Cambodians in Thailand used this technique
when its members were repeatedly told by witnesses that, when Cambodians living in a certain
area controlled by the Khmer Rouge try to escape, Khmer Rouge soldiers shoot them. Invariably,
the assertion was made as a generalization. Each time this assertion was made, the delegation
followed up with the question, "Do you know ofany particular instances in which this happened?"
Invariably, the witness described the same incident that had taken place several years earlier.
Although the basis of the witnesses' assertion apparently was this sole incident, camp residents
tended to convey the impression that the practice was routine, either because of cultural
differences in expression or because the episode had been so traumatic that the community had
collectively interpreted it as a general principle. See KAMPUCHEA: As'ER THE WORsT, supra
note 112, at 205-6.
115. See Rone Interview, supra note 111. The degree to which witnesses are willing to provide
such information varies from one country and context to another. It is important, therefore, for
interviewers to know what information is considered sensitive in the context of the particular
interviews. See Training Session Transcript, supra note 92, at 14-15.
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hesitant to provide in response to a direct question. In many situations
of armed conflict, for example, civilians are reluctant to attribute
responsibility for land mines placed in or near their community, even
if they know which party was responsible. But they may be willing
to answer such questions as: "Does the military patrol here?" "Do the
guerrillas patrol here?" "Were the guerrillas here in the last three
months [when the key incident occurred]?" "Was the military here in
the last three months?" The answers to such questions may provide
the investigator strong circumstantial evidence of which side was
116
responsible for the violation.
Particularly when an investigator is conducting his first inquiry in
a country, it is useful to ask questions relating to general living
conditions or the local political context before seeking detailed information about particular violations. 117 Without this background, the
interviewer may fail to appreciate the significance of some aspects of
the witness' testimony. 118 More generally, good interviewers pick up
on subtle cues in the witnesses' language-or in their omissions-that
may flag an important issue. 119
4. Corroborating Direct Testimony
Human rights investigators use a broad range of techniques to
corroborate testimony of victims and eyewitnesses. Highly persuasive
forms of corroboration, such as autopsy reports concluding that torture
inflicted during detention was the cause of death, are simply unavailable in many situations investigated by NGOs. In these circumstances,
investigators turn to other means of corroboration that, while not
conclusive standing alone, contribute to a broader process of
verification.
Under any circumstances a skilled interviewer can test a witness'
testimony during the interview itself. One important test is the in116. Id.
117. See Rone Interview, supra note 111.
118. For example, when Rone undertook a fact-finding inquiry into violations of the laws of
war in Angola, she learned that the staple crop for Angolans, manioc, is left in the ground until
it is ready for consumption, and thus can readily be stolen. Rone later learned that rebel soldiers
regularly stole manioc from the civilian fields in eastern Angola both for their own sustenance
and as part of a deliberate war strategy based on starvation of villagers living in governmentcontrolled areas. See id.; see also AFRiCA WATCH, ANGOLA, supra note 96, at 83-87.
119. When, for example, Rone was conducting an inquiry into human rights violations in
El Salvador, a woman whose son had been killed several years earlier asserted that she had not
recognized the assailants, who had burst into the family home. The witness, Rone recalls,
"mumbled something about agrarian reform." Following up on this cue, Rone learned that the
victim had been working on agrarian reform during a period when such people were systematically
being killed. The witness apparently did not want to speak directly about this because some of
the people responsible for her son's murder were still in the vicinity. See Rone Interview, supra
note 111.
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ternal consistency and coherence of the testimony. When an interviewer doubts a particular aspect of the witness' testimony, it may be
useful for the interviewer to return to the subject several times during
the interview, using different questions to "get at" the troublesome
part of the witness' account. This approach would enable the interviewer to observe whether the account remains consistent through each
rendering.
Sometimes, however, apparent inconsistencies arise from gaps in
communication between the interviewer and the witness. Interviewers
should be aware of this possibility and attempt to phrase questions in
a manner that will minimize this basis of seeming inconsistency.
Often, when an interviewer reviews a confusing part of the testimony
with a witness, the witness is able to supply persuasive clarifying
information.
Another important index of the credibility of a witness' testimony
is the extent to which her allegations conform with general human
rights patterns in the country. While this may not conclusively establish the witness' credibility, her account's consistency with known
patterns at least establishes that her allegations are plausible. 120
An interviewer who has special expertise on a country can draw
upon his knowledge to devise "tests" of a witness' credibility. For
example, when Stephen Heder interviewed Cambodian exiles in Thailand, 12 1 he drew upon his encyclopedic knowledge of Cambodia to
assess the credibility of testimony. When, for example, a witness
claimed that in a certain year he had lived in a particular town where
he had held a position that gave him access to the information he
claimed to possess, Heder would ask such questions as who was the
head of the local administrative committee during the relevant period.
Sometimes, physical evidence that corroborates portions of a witness'
testimony can be obtained during the interview. If a witness claims
he was tortured in a manner that ordinarily would leave a scar, the
interviewer should try to corroborate the allegations through visual
inspection. The presence of scars that appear to a lay observer to be
consistent with the allegations may not be conclusive corroboration, 122
120. When an NGO investigates a closed country about which limited information is
available, its delegates may have little basis for assessing whether the allegations made by the
first few witnesses they interview fit a general pattern; by the time they have interviewed scores
of witnesses, however, patterns begin to emerge which provide a measuring rod against which
all of the testimonies--including the earlier ones--can be assessed.
121. Heder participated in a 1984 fact-finding inquiry on behalf of the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights.
122. In some contexts, reliable observers have found that former detainees at times inflict
wounds upon themselves to support fabricated allegations of abuse, either to discredit the
detaining authority for political reasons, or to justify to friends why they "broke down" during
an interrogation in which they provided important information to the interrogator. Some
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but either their presence or absence is a useful indication of the truth
of the witness' claim.
In evaluating credibility, it is always relevant to assess the personal
motivations of witnesses. Testimony is, of course, most persuasive
when the witness has no apparent personal interest in the allegations,
or when her statements actually run counter to her personal interest.
Sometimes, however, the most direct evidence available comes from
unquestionably partisan sources. While partisan interest does not render witnesses incapable of being truthful, it does signal the need to
obtain corroborating evidence strong enough to rebut presumptions
that the witnesses' testimony is unreliable. 123
In many cases, elements of a witness' testimony can be corroborated
from sources external to the interview. It may be possible, for example,
to corroborate some aspects of testimony through a visual inspection
of the site of an alleged incident. Sometimes, portions of a witness'
testimony can be corroborated by reference to court records, police
logs, medical, or inquest records. Even when these and other sources
address only some details of a witness' account, the corroboration helps
establish general credibility.
The testimony of other witnesses to the same alleged incident can
provide strong corroboration. It is, in fact, desirable to interview
several witnesses to a disputed incident whenever possible. The sheer
repetitiveness of allegations of various witnesses lends each account
credibility, provided the witnesses were interviewed under circumstances minimizing the risk of coordination. Also, since various witnesses are likely to have observed and recalled different aspects of an
event, the researcher will obtain a more complete picture of what
24
actually happened if she interviews as many witnesses as possible. 1
In these circumstances, skilled interviewers often attempt to elicit
seemingly irrelevant details, like the weather conditions at the time
of an alleged military attack, as well as the central facts of the reported
violations. This information can be a useful basis for assessing the
credibility of accounts, since witnesses are unlikely to coordinate a
fabricated account to the extent of agreeing on such details. 125

allegations of abuse can only be corroborated reliably by a medical inspection. For an example
of such corroboration, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THAILAND: TORTURE OF THREE KAMPUCHEAN NATIONALS (ASA 39/06/86, 1986) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
THAILAND].

123. See Al, SOMALIA, supra note 97 ("Information from political sources, such as opposition
organizations, has been careflully scrutinized in order to ensure that Amnesty International's
reporting on Somalia and appeals to the government of Somalia are based on reliable and
impartial evidence which has been corroborated by independent sources.").
124. Training Session Transcript, supra note 92.
125. Id.
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A human rights investigator should not, however, expect to find
perfect concordance with respect to every detail from one account to
the next. Human perceptions and memory are imperfect at best, and
the most reliable accounts of eyewitnesses may vary with respect to
such details as the estimated time of an event. Experienced fact-finders
develop the ability to detect which discrepancies cast doubt upon
witnesses' allegations, and which ones merely reflect the level of
ambiguity that surrounds any recalled event.
Finally, as elaborated in Part IIIB 1, some allegations can be confirmed through admissions by the responsible authorities, while the
credibility of others can be tested by the government's response even
when the allegations are disputed.

5. Refugee Testimony
As much of the preceding discussion has suggested, NGOs repeatedly have undertaken on-site visits to refugee settlements to investigate
human rights conditions in countries that deny direct access. Such
inquiries raise special questions about witness credibility. Traditionally, refugees have been regarded as relatively unreliable witnesses,
principally because they have been thought to be inherently biased,
and also because, having left their country of origin, they have been
thought incapable of providing sufficiently direct testimony to be
persuasive witnesses. 126
In recent years various human rights organizations have reconsidered
these assumptions. Because some of the most repressive governments
deny entry to outside investigators, NGOs' failure to use refugee
testimony could preclude scrutiny of serious offenders. Moreover, modern history is replete with instances in which refugee reports were
among the most important early indicators of large-scale tragedies.' 27
In many contexts, refugees are capable of providing eyewitness testimony of recent violations; the fact that they are interviewed outside
their country's national borders does not change this.
While an investigator's inability to visit the refugee's country of
origin forecloses some avenues of corroboration, others, such as medical
examination of wounds or comparison with other refugees' accounts,
remain available. As with any interview situation, investigators can
take precautions to enhance the reliability of refugee testimony, such
126. See generally REFUGEE POLICY GROUP, REFUGEES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A RESEARCH
AND POLICY AGENDA 4-6 (1989); ASIA WATCH & MINNESOTA LAWYERS INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTFEE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
KOREA 6 (1988).
127. See SHAWCROSS, THE QUALITY OF MERCY: CAMBODIA, HOLOCAUST AND MODERN

CONSCIENCE 45-69 (1984).

HarvardHuman Rights Journal / Vol. 3
as interviewing new arrivals who have not been exposed to collective
pressures, and interviewing all refugees privately.
The increasingly sophisticated fact-finding skills of many human
rights professionals has made it possible to overcome, at least in
substantial part, many of the problems relating to refugee testimony
previously thought insurmountable. Although use of refugee testimony still poses special challenges to the finder of fact, it is now clear
that refugee testimony, when properly obtained and tested, can yield
reliable information.

B. Admissions Against Interest and Other Official Statements of Policy
Official statements of government (or guerrilla) policy are a key
source of information about human rights conditions in a country.
Such statements include formally-adopted policies; informal articulations of policy by authoritative officials, including public statements;
and laws, presidential decrees, and administrative regulations. 128

1. Admissions Against Interest
Official statements that are "admissions against interest" have strong
probative value. When a high-level official publicly admits that her
government is responsible for certain practices that violate international law, the acknowledged practice is taken out of the realm of
controverted allegations.
This happened when the head of Nicaragua's Penitentiary Service
acknowledged to a human rights delegation in June 1984 that the
Nicaraguan government had, in several instances, deliberately kept
prisoners in detention after their criminal sentences had been served. 129
Similarly, a Helsinki Watch/Asia Watch representative was able to
conclude that certain mujahedin groups opposing the Soviet-backed
government in Kabul practiced a policy of killing prisoners of war
after summary trials after numerous mujahedin commanders described
the practice to her. 130

128. NGOs typically undertake substantial research of the laws of countries which they
monitor, as well as press accounts of official statements of relevant policy, in advance of human
rights missions. Delegates on a human rights mission also generally seek meetings with appro-

priate government officials during their visit to a country; in part so they can solicit the
government's views and positions with respect to the subjects under investigation.
129. See LAWYSRS COMIITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, NICARAGUA: REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE
127-28 (1985).
130. See HELSINKI WATCH & ASIA WATCH, By ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT: VIOLATIONS
OF THE LAws OF WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 63 (1988).
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2. Other Statements of Policy
Admissions against interest are made with greater frequency than
might be imagined, but more often, statements of official policy
proclaim respect for human rights even when systematic patterns of
abuse have been reliably documented. Also, government officials frequently deny that state actors are responsible for reported abuses, or
insist that violations happen only occasionally and do not reflect official
policy.
The evidentiary significance of such statements must, of course, be
evaluated in light of relevant circumstances. If there is truly overwhelming evidence of pervasive human rights violations, official denials may be evidence of government complicity. Similarly, when the
official account of an incident is patently inconsistent with other
evidence, the government's version may lend weight to allegations of
official responsibility, and signify that the government is attempting
131
a "cover-up."
Some government statements fairly can be interpreted, in light of
prevailing conditions, as condoning or even encouraging human rights
violations. A striking instance of such a statement was made by
Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs in August 1976:
My idea of subversion is that of the left wing terrorist
organizations. Subversion or terrorism of the right is not the
same thing. When the social body of the country has been
contaminated by a disease that corrodes its entrails, it forms
antibodies. These antibodies cannot be considered in the same
way as the microbes. As the government controls and destroys
the guerrilla, the action of the antibody will disappear, as is
already happening. It is only a natural reaction to a sick
body. 132
Spoken at a time when, according to AI, "right-wing terrorism ha[d]
clearly been responsible for many brutal assassinations,"'' 33 the state131. An incident cited in a 1977 report on Argentina by AI exemplifies the point. A young
woman was abducted by government forces and detained in a federal police station in Buenos
Aires. Two weeks after her abduction, her family was told by the military police that the young
woman had been transferred to Mar del Plata. When relatives filed a writ of habeas corpus
several weeks later, local police informed them that the victim had been "killed in combat" in
Mar del Plata. Al observed:
At no time was the girl's family given official notification of a release . . . . Her
sudden and violent death, in a town more than 400 kilometres from her home, when
she was known to be in the custody of the army, makes the official account of her
death improbable in the extreme.
AMINESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO ARGENTINA

6-15 NOVEMBER 1976, at 34 (ASA 68/00/77, 1977) [hereinafter AI MISSION TO ARGENTINA].

132. Id. at 35.
133. Id. at 34.
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ment was not only a barely-disguised apologia for the violence, it was
virtually an invitation for the violence to continue. Encouragement of
violence sometimes takes the form of official statements identifying
categories of people as "enemies" of the state. In El Salvador, the
Philippines, and numerous other countries, statements to this effect
by military or civilian officials have been followed by targeted persecution-including extrajudicial executions--of persons identified as
"enemies." Human rights monitors, lawyers handling human rights
cases, trade unionists, and church workers have frequently fallen victim
to government persecution in these circumstances. 134
In some circumstances, a government's silence in the face of a
pattern of serious violations may signify toleration. Similarly, a civilian
leader's failure to speak (or act) forcefully enough may make her
complicit in abuses committed by her subordinates, even if she may
not actually approve of the tactics. In this respect, a government's
implementation of a human rights policy turns on tone as much as
substance. The effect is most evident in countries where the tone and
vigor of a proclaimed human rights policy has changed in a short
period, even though the policy has not been renounced as such. 135

3. National Laws
Laws, official decrees, and regulations are also important evidence
of government policy. The laws themselves may violate international
human rights standards. Or they may stand as a virtual invitation to
abuse because they accord government authorities unbridled powers of
arrest and detention, while failing to provide adequate safeguards
against--or remedies for--abuses. 36 Emergency legislation and martial law decrees often fall into this category. If national legal safeguards
against abuses are flagrantly violated, the gap between law and practice
134. See generally AMERICAS WATCH, METHODOLOGY AT ODDS WITH KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 46; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENTS 103 (1983);

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, URGENT ACTION, UA 209/89 (June 29, 1989) (25 people named
on "hit list" in the Philippines).

135. When, for example, Americas Watch evaluated human rights in Peru after President
Alan Garcia Perez's first year in office, it expressed concern about ominous developments, but
praised the government's efforts to improve human rights. AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN PERU, supra note 61. Two years later, Americas Watch placed substantial blame on President
Garcia for a serious deterioration in human rights conditions. Although Garcia had not retreated
from his earlier human rights policy in so many words, Americas Watch concluded that, by
late 1988, the government's "passivity [had] given way to apparent acquiescence, reflecting what
seems to be a perception that abuses are inevitable." AMERICAS WATCH, TOLERATING ABUSES:
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERU 8 (1988).
136. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING, supra note 42, at 72 ("Laws and proclamations by which human rights are suspended or infringed may safely be regarded as conclusive,
the presumption being justified that laws and official policies are implemented in practice.").
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may justify the conclusion that the government does not respect the
137
rule of law.
Authoritative interpretations and applications of national laws are
also relevant evidence of a government's human rights record, often
signifying wholesale complicity in abuses by the judiciary. In many
countries that have experienced prolonged periods of martial law, for
example, the nations' courts have legitimized extraordinary measures
taken by the executive, 138 sometimes abdicating responsibility for
maintaining the rule of law and even condoning official torture. 139

C. Secondary Sources
While direct evidence and official policy statements are the foundations of most human rights reports, NGOs also consult a broad
range of secondary sources. These include domestic NGOs that monitor human rights conditions and/or provide legal defense to victims
of human rights abuses; lawyers or lawyers' organizations that handle
human rights cases; university research centers that monitor human
rights conditions; journalists; press accounts; relevant literature on the
country that is the subject of inquiry; and various informed observers,
such as academic analysts, foreign diplomats, the staff of international
relief or private voluntary organizations, and local political, religious,
and business leaders.
137. Similarly, a pattern of disregard by government agents of court orders, such as orders
directing prison officials to release particular detainees, is an important index of the extent to
which a government respects the rule of law.
The impact of laws and the conduct of courts on general human rights conditions is so
substantial that many NGO reports are devoted exclusively, or in large part, to analyses of these
subjects. See, e.g. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EGYPT: ARBITRARY DETENTION AND TORTURE
UNDER EMERGENCY POWERS (1989); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC: SWEEPING LAWS--SECRET JUSTICE (1989); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
UNDERWRITING INJUSTIcE: AID AND EL SALVADOR'S JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM (1989).
138. See Al MISSION TO ARGENTINA, supra note 131, at 12-13 (concluding that Argentina's
Federal Court, by upholding extraordinary legislation authorizing Executive to exercise certain
powers, had "broken with one of the most fundamental tenets of the Constitution, for the
Executive Power is now engaged in the exercise of judicial functions."); LAWYERS COMMITTEE
FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PHILIPPINES: A COUNTRY IN CRISIS 58-59 (ASA
608/00/77, 1983).
139. A striking instance in which court proceedings were used as evidence of both statesponsored torture and court complicity is Brasil: Nunca Mais ("Brazil: Never Again"), a report
prepared by the Archdiocese of Brazil on the use of torture by military authorities. Working
secretly, the "Brasil: Nunca Mais" project examined the records of virtually all political cases
prosecuted in Brazilian military courts between April 1964 and March 1979. The court records
established "that torture was an essential part of the military justice system in Brazil," and that
military courts "were fully
aware of the routine use of torture during preliminary inquests, and
that evidence produced under torture was considered valid in the courtroom, even when defendants revealed how their confessions had been extracted." TORTURE IN BRAZIL: A REPORT BY
THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SAO PAULO x (J. Dassin ed. 1986) [hereinafter TORTURE IN BRAZIL].
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Such secondary sources are consulted for several reasons. First, many
of these sources can contribute to the researcher's understanding of
the context in which particular developments occur. This sort of
contextual framework helps the researcher interpret the significance of
discrete events and discern their relationship to broader trends. Second,
many of the sources noted above can direct NGOs to eyewitnesses and
victims. 140
Third, in some instances NGOs use substantive information provided by secondary sources as part of the body of evidence presented
in their published reports. 14 1 In countries where they can and do
operate, domestic human rights monitors have often been particularly
important sources of such information. Although a full discussion of
this subject is beyond the scope of this Article, issues bearing on the
reliability and value of information generated by domestic NGOs
merits special note.
1. Domestic Human Rights Monitors
If a domestic NGO's methodology is sound, it can provide international NGOs with invaluable information, such as comprehensive
statistical data reflecting overall patterns and trends. 142 This sort of
data, which is difficult for an international NGO to assemble from
afar, helps researchers assess the overall extent of abuses reported by
individual victims and eyewitnesses, and the extent to which individual accounts fit into discernible patterns: geographical, temporal, or
otherwise.
Although most NGOs prefer to use accounts which their own staff
have investigated, an NGO may include in its reports some information obtained by domestic NGOs to help present a more comprehensive picture of human rights conditions than would be possible if
it used only accounts which its staff had documented. 143 If an international NGO relies upon the reporting of a domestic NGO in this
fashion, it must be prepared to defend the reliability of the domestic
NGO. 144
140. For discussion of issues relating to the identification of persons who can provide direct
evidence, see Part IIIAL.

141. Policies respecting the use of secondary sources for this purpose vary significantly among
international NGOs.

142. An analysis of the limitations of statistical data in human rights research is beyond the
scope of this Article.
143. Even ifa foreign NGO conducted its own investigation of an incident, it might publish
information gathered by another investigator if the latter were able to establish details that did
not emerge in the foreign NGO's investigation. This situation might arise, for example, if a

domestic monitor was able to visit the site of an alleged incident in the immediate aftermath,
before witnesses dispersed or physical evidence was destroyed.
144. Precisely because of the important role that some domestic NGOs have assumed as
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In evaluating the methodology of domestic monitors, international
NGOs recognize that relevant standards must be flexible enough to
reflect the extreme variations in circumstances-including the physical
risks-in which local staff operate. Even within a country, the degree
of verification that is possible often varies considerably from one region
to the next-violations committed in large urban centers may be more
susceptible to investigation than those committed in remote rural
regions-and from one type of abuse to another. 145
Whatever the prevailing circumstances, international NGOs must,
in attempting to evaluate the reliability of a domestic monitor's information, familiarize themselves in detail with the local organization's
methodology. They must, for example, ascertain what standards of
verification the domestic organization applies to determine whether to
include an alleged incident in its published reports. Does its staff
personally investigate each incident? If so, what methodology does it
use to verify allegations or reports? Does it obtain eyewitness testimony
in every instance? Does it send an investigator to examine the site of
an incident if a visual inspection would help establish the facts? Are
any of its statistical data based upon presumptions of fact?
An essential part of evaluating a domestic NGO's methodology is
becoming thoroughly familiar with the definitions it employs, including all of the elements that it believes must be established before it
will categorize an incident as a particular type of abuse and include
the incident in its published reports. If a domestic NGO's reports
include a category of violations called "massacres," what does that
mean? How many victims must there be in an incident before it will
be considered a "massacre"? Does the NGO include incidents in this
sources of information publicized by prominent international NGOs, in recent years the methodology of the former has been subjected to heightened international and national scrutiny. For
example, when the Reagan Administration sought to defend its support for the Salvadoran
military during a period of staggering rights violations, it went to considerable lengths to
discredit the methodology of the leading human rights monitoring organization in El Salvador.
Such efforts threaten more than the credibility of the NGO's data; they can significantly
increase the risks faced by domestic monitors, who in many countries face targeted persecution
because of their work. For this reason, international NGOs have publicly defended the right of
domestic monitors to pursue their work free of harassment, even when the former do not rely
upon the latter's data.
145. For example, when the incidence of mutilation of victims of death squad violence in El
Salvador reached extreme proportions in the early 1980s, it became increasingly difficult for
domestic monitors to obtain positive identification ofvictims. The leading Salvadoran monitoring
group at that time, Socorro Juridico del Arzbispado (Legal Aid Office of the Archdiocese of San
Salvador), adapted its methodology accordingly, and included these killings in its statistical data
when there was strong circumstantial evidence of government responsibility. The work of Socorro
Juridico, which was founded in 1975 and given official status within the Archdiocese in 1977,
was taken over and expanded by Tute/a Legal del Arzbispado (Legal Trusteeship Office of the
Archdiocese) in May 1982. See AiERIcAs WATCH, METHODOLOGY AT ODDS WITH KNOWLEDGE, supra note 46, at 17, 40.
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category regardless of whether it has determined that the victims were
civilians killed in violation of applicable international standards, or
might the statistics also include attacks against guerrillas or civilians
caught in the crossfire of a military operation? If an NGO reports
both "massacres" and "political killings," does it make a determination
to place an incident in only one category, or might "political killings"
include cases separately reported as "massacres"?
In assessing the significance of a domestic monitor's statistics, it is
important to ascertain what is necessary to trigger its investigation.
An organization that initiates investigations based upon a broad range
of sources of information, including press reports as well as victims'
denunciations, is likely to produce a more representative picture of
the human rights situation than one that records only incidents reported to its office by victims or their relatives, particularly if the
monitor is based in a nation's capital and many serious human rights
violations occur in other cities or in remote rural areas.
If it relies on information provided by a domestic monitor, an
international NGO must attempt to identify all sources of distortion
in the local monitor's methodology, and make clear in its own reports
what those distortions are and how they can be expected to skew the
data. If, for example, the domestic monitor uses press accounts to
trigger its investigations, the international NGO must be thoroughly
acquainted with the reporting standards of the local press. Distortions
built into its coverage of human rights violations would be reflected
in the monitor's data as well.
The most common distortion in domestic NGOs' statistical data is
underreporting. In countries where serious human rights violations
occur on a wide scale, no organization is capable of investigating-or
even learning of--every incident of abuse. Another common distortion
in data used to evaluate longitudinal trends arises from improvements
over time in an NGO's investigative resources and/or its methodology.
Evaluation of a domestic monitor's data does not necessarily end
when an international NGO is satisfied that the underlying methodology satisfies standards that are appropriate to the circumstances. The
leading international NGOs rely upon a domestic source's information
only after their own staff has had numerous opportunities over a long
period to investigate incidents reported by the local monitor and has
found that the reports of the latter "hold up."
The foregoing discussion of domestic NGOs' reliability has focused
on their fact-finding methodology. But like international NGOs, domestic monitors are also subject to criticism on the basis of charges
that they are politically biased. 46 The charge frequently emanates
146. Such charges have often been reported in the international press. See,e.g., Munro, The

1990 / Human Rights Fact-Finding
from officials of the government whose abuses are publicized by a
domestic monitor.
The charge is often unfounded, frequently disingenuous, and should
be regarded with extreme caution. Sometimes, however, charges of
political bias include an element of truth. Especially difficult questions
are raised when the staff of a domestic NGO that monitors abuses
committed in a context of internal armed conflict includes people who
support the insurgents.
Is this a fair basis for discrediting the reporting of the NGO? The
fact is that the presence of persons who support an illegal insurgency
on an NGO's staff will affect the organization's credibility internationally. Whether it ought to is another question. Bearing in mind
that the staff of domestic NGOs often represent a political crosssection of the nation, if an NGO does not institutionally endorse the
views of individual staff members, it may be unfair to discredit the
organization's work on this basis, particularly if its methodology is
sound in every respect that can be measured objectively. 147
Nor should the fact that local insurgents seek to exploit the work
of a domestic NGO taint the credibility of the organization. The fact
that insurgents exploit reports of government violations does not in
itself render the accounts untrue, any more than an insurgent group's
decision to exploit a government's failure to deliver basic services
would make the failure itself illusory. If, however, an organization
purporting to be a human rights group is linked institutionally to a
party to armed conflict, the information generated by the entity simply
will not be credible148 without corroboration by a reliable source. 149

New Khmer Rouge, CONMENTARY, Dec. 1985, at 19; Branigin, PhilippineRebels TargetingRights
Groups, Churches, Wash. Post, Oct. 18, 1986, at A13, col. 1 (charging infiltration of Philippine

human rights groups by communist insurgents).
147. How international NGOs address this issue is affected, inevitably, by the risks that
often attend public charges by government officials that a domestic monitor's staff is "infiltrated"

by insurgents or sympathizers. As noted earlier, in many countries the charge itself serves as a
virtual death warrant, and such charges frequently have been followed by targeted persecution
of human rights monitors. See Part 1ID, supra text accompanying note 79.
For this reason, when international NGOs protest government officials' accusations that a
particular domestic NGOs' staff includes persons who sympathize with armed rebels, the former
are not necessarily disputing the factual allegation; more likely they are saying that the allegations, even if true, would nor make the staff legitimate targets of execution, torture or other
human rights violations, and that the public accusations, under prevailing circumstances that
cannot be disregarded, are irresponsible because they endanger the staff.
148. See Neier, Not All Human Rights Groups Are Equal, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1989, at 22,
col. 5.
149. As noted in Part IIIA1, even clearly partisan sources are sometimes useful in directing
NGOs to reports that bear investigation. The quality of information furnished by partisan
sources varies enormously. NGOs that continuously monitor a country generally are able to
gauge the relative reliability of each source's information, and learn which sources-partisan or
not-generate "leads" that tend to bear out upon investigation.
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2. Press Sources
International NGOs sometimes cite press accounts as sources of
information included in country reports. Typically, however, careful
NGOs do not cite press accounts unless their research staff have reason
to credit the report.

The staff of the most prominent NGOs make a point of learning
about the relative reliability of various press sources in and around the

countries they monitor. Also, NGOs frequently corroborate specific
accounts of incidents reported in the press before citing the latter in
150
their own reports.
D. EstablishingResponsibility
One of the most important findings of fact which a human rights
investigator must attempt is a determination of responsibility (or
probable responsibility) for alleged violations. Because international
human rights law establishes obligations binding upon states and
humanitarian law establishes obligations of parties to armed conflicts,
whether certain actions generate international responsibility depends
upon the identity of the perpetrator. In the context of human rights/
humanitarian law fact-finding, the determination of responsibility
entails several levels.
1. Individual Responsibility
The finder of fact must, in the first instance, attempt to determine
individual responsibility for particular instances of abuse. Although
conceptually straightforward, this determination can be methodologically challenging since governments frequently go to great lengths to
obfuscate evidence of involvement in abuses.
Nevertheless, in many instances human rights investigators can
breach the wall of secrecy through direct evidence. 151 For example,
relatives or neighbors of a person who has "disappeared" sometimes
witness the abduction and can positively identify the abductors as
police or military agents. 15 2 But in the absence of direct evidence,
circumstantial and inferential evidence play a key role in NGO efforts
to establish probable responsibility. 153 In some instances, circumstan150. Thus, citations in NGO country reports to particular press items may obscure the fact
that the NGO has in fact undertaken its own research into the event or developments described.
151. SeeAl MISSION TO ARGENTINA, supra note 131.
152. See id. at 27. In the majority of cases where someone was reported as missing in
Argentina at the time of Amnesty International's investigation, the abduction was witnessed by

friends or relatives.
153. For discussion of the role of circumstantial and inferential testimony in international
adjudication, see Part lIE, supra text accompanying notes 80-85.
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tial evidence can be quite compelling, establishing a prima facie case
of government or insurgent responsibility. 154
Even when circumstantial evidence of government responsibility is
virtually conclusive, NGOs may not be able to identify the individuals
who actually carried out or ordered the violations without the cooperation of responsible authorities or other forms of direct evidence. In
these instances, the concept of establishing a prima facie case of
government responsibility becomes especially important. If an NGO
can make out a strong prima facie case that a state agent or organ was
responsible for a human rights violation, the NGO's fact-finding can
be a persuasive basis for urging that the government undertake a
thorough investigation and bring to justice those responsible for the
abuse.

2. Systematic Violations
The effort to attribute responsibility does not end with a determination of who probably carried out individual acts of abuse. In preparing country reports, NGOs also attempt to ascertain the extent to
which individual violations reflect official policy.
Even when a government is unequivocally committed to human
rights, isolated lapses from policy occur; individual agents of the state
commit aberrant abuses. At the other extreme, human rights violations
sometimes are a result of deliberate government policy. And between
these two extremes, various levels of government responsibility for
human rights violations shade into each other.
Although internationally-protected rights can be violated by an
isolated lapse from government policy, the degree of state responsibility for abuses has significant bearing on the appropriate international
response. International law looks, in the first instance, to the state to
provide redress for violations of human rights committed in territory
subject to its jurisdiction. Indeed, the state's provision of a remedy
for rights violations is a sine qua non element of its general obligation
to ensure enjoyment of particular rights by persons subject to its
jurisdiction. 155
154. For example, a report on Indonesia by Asia Watch describes the death-in-detention of
a young man who appeared to be in good health when his mother visited him in jail the day
before he died. When the family saw the victim's corpse, they observed that both of his legs
and wrists appeared to be broken, and that "'[h]is mouth was very swollen and some of the
teeth were loose."' See ASIA WATCH, HumAs RIGHTS IN INDONESIA, supra note 97, at 187. In
this case, other evidence reinforced the inference of police responsibility. Other witnesses had
seen the victim return to his cell in a weak state and with a bloodied face after being interrogated
in the early morning hours of the same day he died. Id.
155. See generally Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS (Henkin ed. 1981).
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If, then, a particular instance of abuse truly reflects an isolated
lapse, the victim should be able to find a remedy in the domestic legal
system. If, however, the violation reflects a systematic practice, resort
to domestic remedies may be futile. Even if an individual victim is
able to secure redress from national courts, international intervention
would still be appropriate if similar violations persisted on a wide
scale.
This logic underlies the general practice of international tribunals
of requiring petitioners to exhaust domestic remedies as a condition
of admissibility of human rights complaints. Significantly, international tribunals have recognized an exception to the general exhaustion
requirement in cases where alleged human rights violations exemplify
an "administrative practice," defined as a practice that "consists of an
accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently
numerous and interconnected to amount not merely to isolated inci' 156
dents or exceptions but to a pattern or system.
As with individual instances of abuse, circumstantial and inferential
evidence play a key role in determining higher levels of government
responsibility for abuses. When, for example, death-squad violence in
El Salvador surged in the early 1980s, human rights groups used such
evidence to conclude that, in many instances, the perpetrators operated
with government complicity. The victims' bodies were found in areas
where the military, but not the guerrillas, could operate and where
curfews were in effect, suggesting that the perpetrators could only
have acted with the approval of military forces that enforced the
57
curfews. 1
The scale of violations can be an important indication of the nature--as well as the fact-of government responsibility. Thus, in its
report, Nunca Mas, Argentina's National Commission on the Disappeared concluded that "the sheer number of similar and interrelated
cases [of disappearances] . . . makes us absolutely convinced that a

concertedplan of repression existed and was carriedout." 158
Even without overwhelming evidence of deliberate policy at the
highest levels of government, the repetition of particular types of
official abuse on a wide scale justifies a finding that the government
has failed to satisfy its obligations under international human rights
law. 5 9 International tribunals have found that, when such a pattern
156. Ireland v. U.K., supra note 80, at 262; see also The 'Greek' Case, supra note 45, at 19496.
157. See AMERICAS WATCH, METHODOLOGY AT ODDS WITH KNOWLEDGE, supra note 46,
at 33.
158. ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED, NUNCA MAS: THE REPORT
OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED 10 (1986) (emphasis added).
159. Americas Watch applied this type of analysis in a 1989 report on Nicaragua. After its
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is established, the state is ipso facto in breach of its international
obligations. 160 While no state can be expected to erect unbreachable
safeguards against any human rights violations occurring, 161 it can
be-and, under international law, is-expected to respond appropriately to violations.
The major human rights conventions require state parties not only
to refrain from interfering with individuals' enjoyment of the enumerated rights, but affirmatively to "secure" or "ensure" the enjoyment
of those rights; thus public authorities are held responsible for abuses
by subordinates. Interpreting this language in the American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
has held that state parties are obligated to "prevent, investigate, and
punish" violations of certain rights enumerated in the Convention. 162
Accordingly, a government's wholesale failure to investigate and prosecute human rights violations is a strong basis for concluding that it
tolerates the abuses. 163
When a government's response to widespread violations is less stark,
as when it rarely-but nonetheless occasionally-undertakes investigations, or when it initiates prosecutions that rarely culminate in
convictions, NGO fact-finders must attempt to evaluate government
culpability in light of all available evidence-which may include

staff had personally investigated scores of cases in which Sandinista forces appeared to have been
responsible for extrajudicial executions in a northern region of the country, Americas Watch
concluded that the violations "'constitute a pattern of abuses by Government forces,"' noting
that the executions "'are too numerous to be isolated cases."' Stateaent by Americas Watch Executive

Director, Juan Mendez, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1989 at A], col. 6.
160. Applying logic that would have equal force with respect to states' obligations under
other comprehensive human rights conventions, the European Court of Human Rights reasoned
in Ireland v.U.K. that, under the European Convention for Human Rights, "[public] authorities
are strictly liable for the conduct of their subordinates; they are under a duty to impose their
will on subordinates and cannot shelter behind their inability to ensure that it is respected." See
supra Ireland v. U.K. note 80, para. 263.
161. States are, however, generally required to take measures to prevent human rights

violations. In Ireland v. U.K., the European Court of Human Rights considered the type of
training provided to the Royal Ulster Constabulary ("RUC") as relevant evidence of the British
government's responsibility for interrogation practices of the RUC that violated the European
Convention's prohibition of "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." See id., at para.
265 etseq (citing European Convention on Human Rights, art. 3).

162. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 81, para. 166.
163. Writing of the pattern of disappearances committed by Argentine military authorities

during the 1970s, Argentina's National Commission on the Disappeared concluded:
It has repeatedly been claimed that those members of the security forces who committed

any kind of 'excess' during the anti-subversion campaign were properly brought to
justice on the initiative of their commanders. This Commission wishes to deny strongly
any such assertion. From the information we have collected, there is not a single
instance of any member of the security forces being charged with involvement either
in the forced abduction of a person, with the use of torture, or with causing the death
of anyone held in the secret detention centres.
See TORTURE IN BRAZIL, supra note 139, at 10.
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contradictory evidence or may add up to a "mixed" record. Relevant
considerations include the integrity of the investigative process and
the ostensible credibility of the result. Was the inquiry public, or, at
least, was its modus operandi made public? Were knowledgeable
sources encouraged to present testimony? If witnesses did not come
forward, what were their reasons? Were they given appropriate assurances of their physical security? Did the investigative body's conclusions comport with available evidence? Or did it simply repeat denials
of responsibility made by the accused? If a judicial body established
responsibility of military personnel, were the guilty parties actually
arrested? Did they serve a sentence?
A striking characteristic of recent country reports by the most
sophisticated NGOs is their specificity in pinpointing government
responsibility. The reports often identify with particularity the units
or entities responsible for abuses, the apparent level of official authority
for their acts, the geographic reach of the violations, and the intensity
and temporal extent of the abuses. 16 This degree of specificity is
desirable for several reasons. To the extent that a country report forms
part of a dialogue between an NGO and the government whose
practices are scrutinized, 165 the report's persuasive effect will be diminished if it unfairly characterizes the extent of government responsibility for abuses. 166 Also, a high degree of specificity about responsibility for particular abuses better enables the government to conduct
an effective investigation (and creates greater pressure for it to do so
than would a vague allegation of abuse). At the same time, an NGO
that pinpoints responsibility is more likely to appear persuasive to its
audience; the detail it is able to furnish provides evidence of careful
and thorough research.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the 1980s the influence of human rights NGOs has
grown, and it has grown in direct relation to the persuasiveness of
their factual reporting. With this development, the underlying methodology of NGO fact-finding has come under heightened scrutiny,
and at times attack, by government officials, political commentators,
the press, and others. Much of the criticism, while charging NGOs
with political bias, has itself been partisan; often, it has been unfair.
164. A 1989 report by Americas Watch on human rights in Colombia reflects state-of-theart reporting in this regard. AMERICAS WATCH, THE KiLLINGS IN COLOMBIA (1989).
165. SeePart 11B3, supra.
166. SeeNeier, supra note 148 (suggesting that one indication of whether an NGO is a
"genuine" human rights organization rather than a group that uses human rights for partisan
ends iswhether it avoids "sweeping comments, except to the degree that these are sustained by
its detailed findings through field research").
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Still, the overall effect of the scrutiny has been beneficial, prompting
NGOs to aspire to high standards in their recording of facts.
Wide variations in fact-finding circumstances and other constraints
inherent in human rights fact-finding efforts have, nonetheless, prevented NGOs from developing uniformly-applicable methodological
standards. While it is appropriate to preserve flexibility in NGO factfinding methodology, it is possible to identify several general considerations that should guide any substantial fact-finding endeavor, such
as the need to guard against distortions produced by unrepresentative
sampling procedures, the importance of using interview techniques
that enhance the reliability of witness testimony, and the need to
obtain such corroboration as is possible under prevailing conditions.
To be effective, NGOs must also satisfy emerging standardsdiscernible in public critiques of human rights reports-bearing on
institutional credibility. In particular, NGOs must appear to hold all
governments to the same international standards.
Emerging criteria for judging institutional credibility present especially difficult challenges for NGOs. Their concerns as advocacy
organizations may prompt NGOs to take some actions, such as addressing essentially political contextual factors peculiar to a country
or pressing for a ban on foreign aid to a government that violates
human rights, that might jeopardize the organizations' appearance of
political evenhandedness and disinterestedness. While such dilemmas
cannot be eliminated-they are inherent in the advocacy nature of
human rights organizations-NGOs should be mindful of the tradeoffs entailed in some forms of advocacy, and take whatever measures
they can to minimize the risks.

